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FREE SPEECH AND JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF 
Joseph Blocher∗ 
Law often prioritizes justified true beliefs.  Evidence, even if probative and correct, must 
have a proper foundation.  Expert witness testimony must be the product of reliable 
principles and methods.  Prosecutors are not permitted to trick juries into convicting a 
defendant, even if that defendant is truly guilty.  Judges’ reasons, and not just the 
correctness of their holdings, are the engines of precedent. 
Lawyers are, in short, familiar with the notion that one must be right for the right reasons.  
And yet the standard epistemic theory of the First Amendment — that the marketplace of 
ideas is the “best test of truth” — has generally focused on truth alone, as if all true beliefs 
must be treated equally.  This thin account leaves the epistemic theory vulnerable to 
withering criticism, especially in a “post-truth” era. 
This Article suggests that the epistemic theory of the First Amendment might be reframed 
around a different value: not truth alone, but knowledge, roughly defined as justified true 
belief.  Philosophers from Plato until the present day have explored what makes knowledge 
distinct and distinctly valuable; echoes of those efforts can be heard in First Amendment 
theory and doctrine as well.  A knowledge-based account need not limit the protections of 
free speech to justified true belief, any more than the marketplace model covers only truth, 
and may even help resolve thorny First Amendment issues like those involving professional 
speech and institutional deference.  The goal of this Article is to provide a richer epistemic 
account of the First Amendment at a time when it is sorely needed. 
INTRODUCTION 
 century ago, Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States1     
 helped lay the foundations of U.S. free speech law and theory.  
Though he was hardly writing on a blank slate, Justice Holmes captured 
something powerful when he wrote that “the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and . . . truth is the only ground upon which [people’s] wishes 
safely can be carried out.”2  This marketplace of ideas model was “vir-
tually canonized” for generations3 and has shaped First Amendment 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Lanty L. Smith ’67 Professor of Law, Duke Law School.  Many thanks to Rebecca Aviel, 
Vince Blasi, Alan Chen, Claudia Haupt, Paul Horwitz, Sam Kamin, Andy Koppelman, Govind 
Persad, Fred Schauer, Alex Tsesis, and the faculty of University of Denver Sturm College of Law 
for helpful comments, and to Izaak Earnhardt for excellent research assistance. 
 1 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 2 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 3 William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 
30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“The most influential argument supporting the constitutional commit-
ment to freedom of speech is the contention that speech is valuable because it leads to the discovery 
of truth.”); see also Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130 
(1989) (“The most familiar argument for freedom of speech is that speech promotes the discovery  
of truth.”). 
A
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doctrine in significant ways.4  But it was and is, to repurpose Justice 
Holmes’s own words, “an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”5 
Many people seem ready to conclude that the experiment has failed.  
Developments in psychology, economics, history, sociology, and other 
scholarly fields have drawn attention to the host of problems — cogni-
tive limitations, motivated reasoning, racism, sexism, resource inequali-
ties, and the like — that make it impossible for the marketplace of ideas 
to reliably deliver on its promise of identifying “truth.”6  Abrams’s own 
legacy provides an example, since the influence of the case undoubtedly 
owes a great deal to the power and beauty of Justice Holmes’s prose, 
rather than the “truth” of the ideas it expresses.7 
Such critiques are, for the most part, internal to the epistemic theory: 
they accept truth as the end goal of the First Amendment but doubt the 
ability of unregulated speech to deliver it.  Another set consists of exter-
nal challenges — those suggesting that the First Amendment’s lodestar 
is not truth, but democracy, personal autonomy, or some other value.8 
But scholarly debates are not the most serious threat to the market-
place model.  A robust system of free speech depends fundamentally on 
widely shared social, political, and cultural commitments,9 and it would 
be putting it mildly to say that there is widespread anxiety about truth 
and the ability of speech — especially but not exclusively online  
speech — to counter falsehoods and lies.  Every day, headlines deliver 
discouraging answers to John Milton’s rhetorical question, “Let [Truth] 
and falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free 
and open encounter?”10  The undoubted prevalence of free and  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 825 n.7 (2008) 
(collecting cases invoking the marketplace model). 
 5 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 6 See infra section I.B.1, pp. 451–55. 
 7 Cf. Richard A. Posner, Introduction, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES xvii (Richard A. Posner 
ed., 1992) (arguing that some of Justice Holmes’s opinions “owe their distinction to their rhetorical 
skill rather than to the qualities of their reasoning”). 
 8 See infra section I.B.2, pp. 455–59; see also Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First  
Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 909–10 (2010) (noting that “the free speech literature appears 
increasingly to have detached itself from the empirical and instrumental epistemic arguments” 
largely in favor of those based on democracy and autonomy). 
 9 If a citation is necessary, one could do worse than Judge Learned Hand: “Liberty lies in the 
hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no 
constitution, no law, no court even can do much to help it.”  LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF 
LIBERTY (1944), reprinted in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952); John M. Harlan, The Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution: An Excerpt from an Address, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1964) (quoting same). 
 10 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED  
PRINTING 45 (H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1961) (1644); see also Vincent Blasi, A Reader’s 
Guide to John Milton’s Areopagitica, the Foundational Essay of the First Amendment Tradition, 
2017 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 310. 
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accessible true information — one promise of the information age — 
seems to have done little to stem the tide.11 
Against this tide, a retreat from the epistemic theory of the First 
Amendment, or perhaps from free speech altogether, might seem attrac-
tive or even necessary.  After all, if it is to model its own purported 
virtues, the marketplace theory must recognize that it, too, can go the 
way of other “fighting faiths.”12  If we are living in a “post-truth” era,13 
then perhaps we need a post-truth First Amendment. 
And yet such a capitulation could worsen the crisis.  The epistemo-
logical problem of the “post-truth” era is not simply that some people no 
longer value truth, but that so many believe falsehoods.  When people 
act on outlandish but truly held beliefs they often demonstrate a strong — 
even perversely courageous — commitment to what they believe to be 
factual truths.14 
One therefore cannot combat the phenomenon simply by insisting on 
the value of truth.  Nor is it possible to fully sidestep the problem by 
making democracy, autonomy, or some other value the central goal of 
the First Amendment.  Those theories, too, frequently depend in part on 
the epistemic function of free speech.  A well-functioning democracy 
relies on expert knowledge.15  Lies and misinformation can interfere 
with personal autonomy.16 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, 
DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS passim (2018). 
 12 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Justice Holmes 
himself suggested as much: “If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are 
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech 
is that they should be given their chance and have their way.”  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 
673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 13 Amy B. Wang, “Post-Truth” Named 2016 Word of the Year by Oxford Dictionaries, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/post-truth-
named-2016-word-of-the-year-by-oxford-dictionaries/ [https://perma.cc/WV5N-ECAZ] (“It’s official: 
Truth is dead.  Facts are passe.”). 
 14 This is not universally true, of course — some are simply trolling, manipulating, or otherwise 
engaged in expression that is indifferent to truth.  Neither the marketplace model nor my 
knowledge-based alternative is well suited to address situations where truth itself is irrelevant.  
From the perspective of an epistemic theory, and at risk of slight overstatement, “these men are 
nihilists.  There’s nothing to be afraid of.”  THE BIG LEBOWSKI (PolyGram Filmed Entertainment 
& Working Title Films 1998). 
 15 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE, at ix (2012) (“Any modern society 
needs expert knowledge in order to survive and prosper.”); see also TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH 
OF EXPERTISE: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT  
MATTERS 216 (2017) (“[T]he collapse of the relationship between experts and citizens is a dysfunc-
tion of democracy itself.”). 
 16 See, e.g., STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND  
ROMANCE 116–17 (1990); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991) (“Lying creates a kind of mental slavery that is an offense 
against the victim’s humanity for many of the reasons that physical slavery is.”); Jonathan D. Varat, 
Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 
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The challenge, therefore, is to conceptualize the First Amendment in 
a way that recognizes the power of the critiques but also safeguards the 
necessary epistemic values of free speech, above and beyond an unreal-
istic faith that free speech will deliver “truth.”  And because freedom of 
speech is an actual (albeit normative) practice,17 and not just a matter 
of theory, any account of free speech values should be built using the 
materials of that practice, including but not limited to legal doctrine.18  
Those materials should not be expected to point squarely in favor of a 
single, overarching free speech principle,19 but they can still clarify our 
existing commitments and help shape new ones. 
The search for free speech principles has also regularly drawn on 
insights from other disciplines — from the marketplace of ideas as a 
whole.  Indeed, the basic insight of the marketplace metaphor itself had 
earlier been articulated by Milton, Mill, and others, and its announce-
ment in Abrams owes more to economics, political philosophy, and his-
tory than to precedent.20  And because the value of free speech is partly 
an epistemological question,21 it is worth considering that for genera-
tions of epistemologists, the most common lodestar is not truth — the 
central concern of the Holmesian approach to free speech22 — but 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1113 (2006) (noting argument that manipulative lies “are incompatible with 
the respect for human autonomy underlying the First Amendment”); see also IMMANUEL KANT, 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 48 (Lewis White Beck trans., The Bobbs-
Merrill Co. 1959) (1785) (arguing that lies violate human autonomy by treating people as means 
rather than ends). 
 17 It might be more accurate to say “set of practices,” given the many distinct activities that 
reside under the header: freedoms of the press, artistic creation, scientific research, political debate, 
and so on.  See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 14 (1982). 
 18 See POST, supra note 15, at 5 (“To determine the purposes of the First Amendment, therefore, 
we must consult the actual shape of entrenched First Amendment jurisprudence.”); Robert Post, 
Replies, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 618 
(2011) (“Because law typically acquires authority from the commitments and principles of those 
whom it seeks to govern, I have sought to identify this fundamental purpose by inquiring into our 
historical commitments and principles.” (citing Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the 
Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul 
Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1474 (2007))). 
 19 See, e.g., Robert Post, Essay, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1249, 1271 (1995) (“There is in fact no general free speech principle . . . .”); Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, 
Democratic Participation, and First Amendment Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (2011) (“Too 
many values interact in too many complicated ways to expect that a single, or small set of values, 
would emerge as the transcendent master value in resolving freedom of speech questions.  Because 
of this, an eclectic approach is both the most descriptive and the best normative methodology with 
which to approach free speech issues.” (footnote omitted)). 
 20 See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text. 
 21 Cf. Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 U. WASH. L. REV. 445, 
447 (2012) (“[T]he First Amendment faces what I call an epistemological problem: specifically, the 
problem of figuring out just how knowledge fits within the First Amendment.”). 
 22 Even to call it “Holmesian” is to raise questions, for Justice Holmes’s own view of truth was 
complex and debatable.  See Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1015, 1039, 1056–57; infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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knowledge.23  And although there are deep divisions and ongoing  
debates about the definition and value of knowledge (these are the basic 
questions of epistemology, after all24), philosophers since Plato have  
often taken as their starting point a tripartite definition of knowledge  
as justified true belief (JTB),25 and this Article will use the labels  
interchangeably. 
Although JTB has been subject to searching examinations and criti-
cisms far beyond the scope of this Article,26 it remains central in the 
epistemological debates.  The second and third parts of the tripartite 
definition are, generally speaking, less controversial than the first: One 
cannot “know” something that is false,27 or that one does not believe.  
But, and somewhat more controversially, even a true belief will not con-
stitute knowledge if it is not properly justified.  A lucky guess that is 
borne out, for example, or an accurate belief generated by lying or  
manipulation, is not “knowledge.” 
Broadening the First Amendment’s frame to focus on justifications 
of belief, and not just on truth alone, provides a richer epistemic defense 
of the goal of free speech — not just as a means of identifying particular 
factual or political truths, but as a means of strengthening our  
mechanisms of belief.28  Standard accounts focus on the maximization 
of truth but give no particular attention to the justifications for true 
belief — the individual habits of mind29 and social practices30 that sup-
port the acquisition and belief of truths.  This keeps cognition at the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 Matthias Steup, Epistemology, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Dec. 14, 2005), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology [https://perma.cc/4W4T-8BUZ] (“[E]pistemology is 
the study of knowledge and justified belief.”). 
 24 Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Willful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the “Equal  
Culpability” Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994 WIS. L. 
REV. 29, 44 (“[There are] enormous theoretical difficulties in understanding and applying the con-
cept of knowledge.  Epistemologists have sought to elucidate the concept of knowledge and have 
found this project no small task.”). 
 25 See RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, THE FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWING 43 (1982); Stewart  
Cohen, Justification and Truth, 46 PHIL. STUD. 279 (1984) (discussing schools of thought relating 
to justification and truth).  For more classic sources, see ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL  
EXPLANATIONS 172–78 (1981); PLATO, THEAETETUS 201b–201d, at 80 (M.J. Levett trans., 1992). 
See generally BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS SCOPE AND LIMITS passim (1948). 
 26 To take the most obvious example, Edmund Gettier effectively proved that JTB alone cannot 
provide a satisfactory account of knowledge.  See Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963). 
 27 Whether someone can “know” something that is not false, but which has no standard propo-
sitional truth value, is a harder question.  See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, in 
LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 261, 262 (1990) 
(“Knowledge of the heart must come from the heart . . . .”). 
 28 See, e.g., Ashley Messenger, Essay, The Epistemic and Moral Dimensions of Fake News and 
the First Amendment, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 328, 337 (2017) (“If ‘knowledge’ is ‘true, justified 
belief,’ then one who wishes to have knowledge must care about whether that belief is justified.”). 
 29 See infra section II.B.1, pp. 477–82 
 30 See infra section II.B.2, pp. 482–86. 
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center of the First Amendment, while accepting the thrust of the internal 
critiques (which are focused on truth, not justifications) and incorporat-
ing some elements of the external critiques (including the relevance of 
social practices).31 
A knowledge-based approach to free speech can also do better than 
the marketplace model in directly addressing the broader epistemologi-
cal crisis in free speech.  People have access to more information — more 
truth propositions — than ever before, and may continue to believe  
passionately in the importance of truth.  There are, of course, bitter  
disagreements about whether certain ideas are true.  But the more fun-
damental disagreement and doubt is about which sources, practices, and 
institutions provide reliable or otherwise desirable information.32  This 
is a debate about valid justifications, not about whether particular  
beliefs are true, or for that matter whether truth is important. 
In order to be successful, a knowledge-based approach must not only 
address these challenges; it must also account for existing practices and 
legal rules.  Fortunately, what works in theory in this case also works in 
practice.  Many legal rules (and, in some respects, the basic rules of legal 
argumentation) are predicated on a commitment to establishing proper 
justifications.33  If a prosecutor lies to secure the conviction of a guilty 
criminal, he or she will have created a true belief in the minds of the 
jury — but that belief will not be justified, and might not be permitted 
to stand.34 
Of course, the rules of the courtroom do not apply mutatis mutandis 
to public discourse,35 so one must ask whether the First Amendment 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 See infra section I.C, pp. 459–64. 
 32 American Views: Trust, Media, and Democracy, KNIGHT FOUND. (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://knightfoundation.org/reports/american-views-trust-media-and-democracy [https://perma.cc/ 
TL7E-JNW8] (“[M]ost Americans believe it is now harder to be well-informed and to determine 
which news is accurate.  They increasingly perceive the media as biased and struggle to identify 
objective news sources.  They believe the media continue to have a critical role in our democracy 
but are not very positive about how the media are fulfilling that role.”). 
 33 See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 100–01 (Roland 
Gray comp., The MacMillan Co. 1921); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 
633 (1995) (noting that, in “[t]he conventional picture of legal decisionmaking, . . . giving reasons is 
both the norm and the ideal”).  Admittedly, faced with the challenge of legal realism, even defenders 
of the concept of ratio decidendi and precedential reasoning were forced to confront the limits of 
the method.  See Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 
161, 182–83 (1930) (criticizing prevailing wisdom as to which part of a case’s reasoning is actually 
precedential). 
 34 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88–89 (1935).  The same is basically true of the 
exclusionary rule.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961).  For further discussion of this prin-
ciple, see Augustine, To Consentius: Against Lying (H. Browne trans.), in 3 A SELECT LIBRARY 
OF THE NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 481–500 (Philip 
Schaff ed., 1887), which argues categorically against lying, even if it is to “unearth [heretics] out of 
their hiding places,” id. at 481. 
 35 For an exploration of their relationship, see Lisa Kern Griffin, Honesty Without Truth: Lies, 
Accuracy, and the Criminal Justice Process, 104 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 22, 23–25 (2018). 
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can prioritize certain justifications for belief without violating core doc-
trinal and theoretical commitments.  Perhaps most importantly, there is 
a crucial difference between treating justifications as necessary and 
treating them as aspirational.  The JTB approach defended here is of 
the latter variety: it makes knowledge the goal of the First Amendment, 
not a prerequisite for constitutional coverage, just as the marketplace 
model has truth as a lodestar but covers falsehoods as well.  The point 
in either case (or, for that matter, under other theories like those priori-
tizing democracy) is to focus on the goals of free speech, not to conflate 
that end with a particular means. 
This is not a purely normative, theoretical mission — it is inter-
twined with current doctrinal and scholarly controversies regarding  
professional and expert speech, institutionalism, and a general focus on 
social practices in First Amendment doctrine.36  From an epistemic  
perspective, these debates look different through the JTB lens.  There 
might, for example, be a significant difference between a doctor and a 
palm reader describing the outcome of a surgery, even if they say the 
same thing and therefore have identical truth values.  By privileging 
justifications for true belief, the JTB lens could better account for the 
constitutional status of professional speech and knowledge communities 
like universities, and for the attention given to the mental states — for 
example, internal justifications — of speakers and listeners. 
Part I investigates the strengths and weaknesses of the standard ep-
istemic theory of free speech — the marketplace model — and the ways 
in which a thicker epistemology might preserve its core while incorpo-
rating many of the insights of alternative theories rooted in democracy 
and individual autonomy.  Part II attempts to situate the concept of 
“knowledge” in the First Amendment, first by providing an account of 
its constitutional value and then by considering various ways in which 
courts could identify and protect proper justifications for beliefs without 
running afoul of other First Amendment principles.  It uses the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates 
(NIFLA) v. Becerra37 to illustrate how the knowledge-based approach 
might have done a better job than the marketplace model in evaluating 
the constitutional status of professional speech. 
It is important at the outset to clarify the scope of the argument.  
Making justified true belief the central epistemic value of the First 
Amendment could potentially help solve these and other problems of 
doctrine and theory, but it would not necessarily involve a radical  
revision, nor would it be applicable in all free speech scenarios.  Like 
the theory it seeks to amend — the marketplace of ideas — the JTB 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 See infra section II.B.2, pp. 482–86. 
 37 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
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approach is most relevant in situations where the epistemic values of 
free speech are in play, and that is not always the case.  Art, political 
opinion, and other important forms of free speech — or, for that matter, 
epistemic claims made in public discourse38 — may be protected for 
reasons not grounded in their “truth.” 
The goal of this Article is not to solve the First Amendment’s epis-
temic crisis, but to suggest a new way to think about it.  The Article’s 
ultimate end is to convince readers that epistemic approaches to the 
First Amendment should — subject to constraints — treat justified true 
belief, rather than truth alone, as the lodestar of free speech values.  Do-
ing so would help address some of the deficiencies in the marketplace of 
ideas model, while providing a richer account of the First Amendment’s 
epistemic goals. 
I.  THE EPISTEMIC FIRST AMENDMENT 
The central First Amendment debate is normative, foundational, 
and unresolved: what is the constitutional value of free speech? The 
volume of scholarly attention devoted to the question is almost incalcu-
lable, and though the question is to some degree insoluble, at its best the 
discussion has been rich and productive39 — a model of the “market-
place of ideas” at work. 
Inquiries into the First Amendment’s purpose are not solely the 
realm of scholars and high theorists.  Doctrinal questions like whether, 
why, and to what extent the First Amendment protects artistic expres-
sion, commercial speech, or professional speech are hard to answer 
based purely on constitutional text, history, or sometimes even prece-
dent.  They depend, in important ways, on normative suppositions 
about the value of free speech.40 
Free speech theories are often distinguished based on whether they 
prioritize democracy, individual autonomy, or the marketplace of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 38 See POST, supra note 15, at 29–31, 43–47. 
 39 See Steven H. Shiffrin, Freedom of Speech and Two Types of Autonomy, 27 CONST.  
COMMENT. 337, 337 (2011) (“[S]ocial reality is too complex to hope or expect that First Amendment 
theory could be reduced to a single value or small set of values.  Nonetheless, extraordinarily fruitful 
scholarship can be produced by those who try.  Such scholarship can show just how far we can get 
by resort to monistic approaches (as well as their limits).” (footnote omitted)). 
 40 See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE SPEECH 
BEYOND WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15–148 (2017)  
(canvassing doctrinal, social, and theoretical explanations for the protection of instrumental music, 
nonrepresentational art, and nonsense); C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial 
Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 985–86 (2009) (arguing that affording commercial speech protection is 
inconsistent with the notion that constitutional protection of speech is intended to ensure  
government respect for individual freedom and autonomy); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 
125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241–42 (2016) (arguing that professions should be regarded as “knowledge 
communities,” a designation that informs the justifications for and limits of speech freedom  
and regulation). 
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ideas.41  It is not my goal here to fully canvass those theories or choose 
among them; I tend to share the view that there are multiple free speech 
values.42  (It follows, and is worth emphasizing, that this Article does 
not purport to present a single all-encompassing First Amendment  
theory.)  But recognizing the inevitability of coexistence and compromise 
is perfectly consistent with efforts to sharpen and refine each of the  
theories in response to criticism.  Democracy-promoting theories, for  
example, have been significantly enriched by efforts to explore not just 
the value of “political speech” in a narrow sense,43 but the broader val-
ues of political equality, participation, and legitimation.44  The goal of 
this Article is to provide a similarly enriching account of the First 
Amendment in which the epistemic value of speech remains central. 
A.  The Standard Account: The Marketplace of Ideas Maximizes Truth 
First Amendment theory is sometimes said to have started with  
Justice Holmes’s paean to truth and free speech in his Abrams dissent.45  
The central passage of that opinion, which many scholars and lawyers 
probably know by heart, is among the most powerful and influential 
ever penned by a Justice: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  That at any 
rate is the theory of our Constitution.46 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 41 Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6–16 (2016) (identifying “the 
most influential schools of free speech theory,” id. at 8, as the acquisition of truth, political speech, 
and self-expression).  In his masterwork, Thomas Emerson provided a slightly different list, specif-
ically by dividing the “democracy” rationale into two.  See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM 
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970) (including self-fulfillment, discovering truth, providing 
for decisional participation, and balancing political adaptability and stability). 
 42 See supra p. 443. 
 43 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 
1, 29 (1971) (arguing that the First Amendment covers only “criticisms of public officials and poli-
cies, proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional provisions and speech ad-
dressed to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country”). 
 44 See POST, supra note 15, at 27–60; James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central 
Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 497–500 (2011). 
 45 See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 
in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 153 (Lee C. Bollinger & 
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (noting that Justice Holmes “virtually invented both First Amendment 
theory and First Amendment doctrine.  He advanced the theory of the marketplace of ideas, and 
he demonstrated how doctrine would have to evolve to implement this new theory”); Frederick 
Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1278 n.97 (2005)  
(noting the view that “the First Amendment started in 1919” when Abrams was penned). 
 46 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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What Justice Holmes meant by this “theory” remains the subject of 
debate,47 but most take it to be an argument that open competition in 
ideas is the best way to guarantee that “the truth will out.”48  That, at 
least, is the version of the theory that tends to crop up in Supreme Court 
opinions.49 
Justice Holmes was not alone in this view.  The “power of the 
thought” he had “accepted” had been more or less identified in  
Areopagitica by John Milton, who asked, “Let [Truth] and falsehood 
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open en-
counter?”50  Two centuries later, in Chapter 2 of On Liberty, John Stuart 
Mill provided a more complete and full-throated defense of the princi-
ple, noting that “it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will 
be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected 
by the present.”51 
As Professor Vincent Blasi has observed, Justice Holmes’s original 
move, and perhaps his boldest claim, was that the theory he described 
was in fact “the theory of our Constitution.”52  One can, however, find 
plenty of support in American law and politics for the notion that the 
competition of ideas will lead to truth.  Defending the idea of religious 
freedom, Thomas Jefferson wrote: 
[T]ruth is great and will prevail, if left to herself; . . . she is the proper and 
sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless 
by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument 
and debate; errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to 
contradict them.53 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 Professor Vincent Blasi, for example, reads Justice Holmes’s commitment to free speech as 
being more about individual character and social participation than about the pursuit, let alone 
acquisition, of any objective “truth.”  See infra section II.A.3, pp. 472–73.  Others, including  
Professor Frederick Schauer, argue that it is important to distinguish between claims about defining 
the truth and claims about locating it.  See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Free Speech, the Search for 
Truth, and the Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L. REV. 231, 236–37 (2017). 
 48 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 2. 
 49 See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 n.2; 
see also, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who 
won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are 
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and 
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protec-
tion against the dissemination of noxious doctrine . . . .”). 
 50 MILTON, supra note 10, at 45; see also Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 
F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950) (“[T]ruth will be most likely to emerge, if no limitations are imposed upon 
utterances . . . .”), aff’d, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); Walter Bagehot, The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration, 
in 3 LITERARY STUDIES 204, 208 (Richard Hold Hutton ed., London, Longmans, Green, and Co. 
1895) (“[I]n discussion truth has an advantage.”). 
 51 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859). 
 52 See Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes Through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1351–54 (1997). 
 53 2 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545, 546 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).  The connection between truth-
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Professor Zechariah Chafee put the point similarly in Freedom of 
Speech, published just a year after Abrams: 
The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this.  One of the most 
important purposes of society and government is the discovery and spread 
of truth on subjects of general concern.  This is possible only through abso-
lutely unlimited discussion, for . . . once force is thrown into the argument, 
it becomes a matter of chance whether it is thrown on the false side or the 
true, and truth loses all its natural advantage in the contest.54 
One could go on multiplying examples. 
Whether or not the marketplace was in fact the theory of our  
Constitution in 1919, Abrams helped make it so going forward.  Indeed, 
Justice Holmes’s opinion has been called “the most powerful dissent in 
American history.”55  Eight years after Abrams, Justice Brandeis ex-
tended Justice Holmes’s dissent (which Justice Brandeis had joined) in 
his own concurring opinion in Whitney v. California56: “[F]reedom to 
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to 
the discovery and spread of political truth.”57  In the case of bad ideas 
or falsehoods, “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence.  Only an emergency can justify repression.”58  In the decades 
since, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the “purpose of 
the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”59 
Most discussion and citation of Abrams has focused on what Justice 
Holmes meant about the “competition of the market” and whether it is 
indeed the “best test” of truth.  But that elides a more fundamental  
question: What did he mean by “truth”?  It seems that Justice Holmes 
did not intend to limit himself to narrowly objective truths.  As discussed 
in more detail below, he was skeptical that such truths exist.60  Instead, 
he defined truth as a kind of “can’t help”: 
[W]hen I say that a thing is true I only mean that I can’t help believing it — 
but I have no grounds for assuming that my can’t helps are cosmic can’t 
helps — and some reasons for thinking otherwise.  I therefore define the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
seeking in free speech and free exercise has been explored in depth by Professor William Marshall, 
among others.  William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 243 (1994). 
 54 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 34 (1920). 
 55 Andrew Cohen, The Most Powerful Dissent in American History, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/08/the-most-powerful-dissent-in-american- 
history/278503/ [https://perma.cc/C5ER-LL2H]; see also THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT  
DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND — AND CHANGED THE 
HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2013); RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: 
THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (1987). 
 56 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 57 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 58 Id. at 377. 
 59 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
 60 See infra note 182. 
  
2019] FREE SPEECH AND JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF 451 
truth as the system of my intellectual limitations — there being a tacit ref-
erence to what I bet is or will be the prevailing can’t help of the majority 
of that part of the world that I count.61 
What is striking about this passage is the degree to which it focuses 
not on accuracy but on grounds for belief — on justifications, in other 
words.  In that sense, it broadens the frame in precisely the same way 
as a knowledge-based account of the First Amendment.  This under-
standing has been overshadowed by the competition-of-truths metaphor, 
but a return to it might represent a better understanding of Justice 
Holmes. 
As Professor Bill Marshall puts it, “the oft-repeated metaphor that 
the First Amendment fosters a marketplace of ideas that allows truth to 
ultimately prevail over falsity has been virtually canonized.”62  But, in 
keeping with its commitment to protecting actual blasphemy,63 First 
Amendment theory subjects even its saints to criticism. 
B.  The Standard Critiques 
All standard versions of the marketplace theory share two basic 
premises: that truth is worth pursuing, and that the free exchange of 
ideas is the best method of pursuit.  It follows that the First Amendment 
should generally be suspicious of speech restrictions, even well-intentioned 
ones, as they will tend to frustrate the identification of truth.  These two 
premises — one establishing an end (truth), the other a means (free trade 
in ideas) — have, in turn, been heavily criticized. 
1.  Internal: Speech Does Not Maximize Truth. — Perhaps the most 
common critique of the marketplace model is that it provides a poor 
means to achieve its own stated goal of discovering truth.  These cri-
tiques are internal to the epistemic approach in that they all accept the 
value of truth, and may even prize it especially highly.  Their concern is 
instrumental: that the marketplace of ideas cannot, in theory or in prac-
tice, achieve that value. 
Some versions of this critique emphasize the ways in which “real” 
markets and the marketplace of ideas are so fundamentally different 
from one another that the “competition” Abrams celebrates is discon-
nected from the end it supposedly serves.  The concepts of consumption 
and price, for example, are foundational in economics but have no clear 
analogue in free speech.64 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 61 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Harold Joseph 
Laski, Professor, London Sch. of Econ. (Jan. 11, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 248 (Mark 
D. Howe ed., 1963) (cited in Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 11 n.36). 
 62 Marshall, supra note 3, at 1. 
 63 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952). 
 64 ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 203–04 (1999).  
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Such objections can partially be met by revising the economic model 
underlying the marketplace of ideas.65  But remapping the economic 
theory of the marketplace of ideas does not avoid — and in fact can 
exacerbate — other objections.  For decades, scholars have pointed to 
ways in which the “myth” of the well-functioning marketplace of ideas 
papers over basic elements of human nature, psychology, and social or-
ganization.66  Like other markets, the marketplace of ideas is subject to 
massive resource inequalities,67 racial and other biases,68 and irrational 
behavior.69  The ascendance of behavioral economics and increased re-
liance on cognitive psychology in law70 have helped document the ways 
in which individual and collective biases interfere with the ability to sort 
and process truth.71  Some legal scholars have begun to investigate the 
question empirically, and their findings — like those of scholars in other 
disciplines — seem to confirm that more speech does not always neces-
sarily lead to more truth.72 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 65 See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 4, at 822 (attempting to incorporate lessons from institutional 
economics).  
 66 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. 
REV. 964, 974 (1978) (“The assumptions on which the classic marketplace of ideas theory rests are 
almost universally rejected today.  Because of this failure of assumptions, the hope that the market-
place leads to truth, or even to the best or most desirable decision, becomes implausible.”); Frederick 
Schauer, Social Epistemology, Holocaust Denial, and the Post-Millian Calculus, in THE CONTENT 
AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH 129, 138 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012) (noting that 
allowing expression of false ideas may “increase the number of people who hold false beliefs”). 
 67 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 66, at 965–66 (pointing to unequal presentation of viewpoints in 
mass media); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 439, 445 (1995) (writing that, although “[i]deas are not as scarce as resources are, . . . there 
may be scarcity in the available means for their dissemination”). 
 68 See, e.g., Shelly Chaiken, Communicator Physical Attractiveness and Persuasion, 37 J.  
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1387, 1394 (1979) (“The present research indicates that physical 
attractiveness can significantly enhance communicator persuasiveness.”); Richard Delgado, Campus 
Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 385–86 (1991) 
(arguing that racist speech distorts discourse by disempowering minority rebuttal, “a result at odds, 
certainly, with marketplace theories of the first amendment”). 
 69 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1131 (1974) (observing that otherwise useful and rational decisionmak-
ing heuristics lead to “systematic and predictable errors”). 
 70 See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473–74 (1998); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and 
Economics 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12879, 2007), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w12879.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KJF-6KPY]. 
 71 Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of 
the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 673–96 (2006) (describing perceptual biases 
that complicate the acquisition and processing of information). 
 72 Schauer noted the existence of this empirical question twenty years ago, and — working with 
an empirical scholar — has recently tested it.  Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Mar-
ketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160, 1160 (2015) (noting that there is “at best mixed support 
for the [marketplace] metaphor’s veracity,” and reporting empirical study of “buffer zones” at poll-
ing places and abortion clinics); Frederick Schauer, Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1309, 1333 (1997) (“A great deal of free speech theory and a great deal of discourse 
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One particularly noteworthy intervention in this regard has come 
from feminist jurisprudence.  Feminist critiques of free speech in the 
context of pornography are well-known and controversial.73  The chal-
lenges those critiques pose to the marketplace of ideas might be less well 
known.74  Feminist free speech scholars have done more than emphasize 
the shortcomings of the standard model — they have proposed alterna-
tive accounts that treat truth not simply as propositional, but as rela-
tional75 and positional.76  This characterization of knowledge creation 
as a social activity77 is hard to square with the traditional marketplace 
model, given the latter’s focus on propositional truth, but it is perfectly 
consistent with richer epistemological accounts that foreground the so-
cial practices justifying belief.78 
In recent years, these long-simmering scholarly debates about the 
marketplace of ideas have been inflamed both inside and outside the 
academy by the perceived increase in public falsehoods, lies, and “fake 
news.”  Efforts to combat falsehoods with counterspeech, as the market-
place model mandates in all but the most limited of circumstances,79 do 
not inspire much confidence.  Many believe that President Donald 
Trump rose to political power not just despite but partially because of 
his penchant for lying and falsely accusing others of doing the same.80  
Although many civil libertarians have rushed to the ramparts,81 some 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
theory is marked by an admirable epistemological optimism, but whether that epistemological op-
timism is well-founded is in the final analysis an empirical question, as to which the resources of 
contemporary social science research might help to locate an answer.”).  
 73 See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981);  
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).  
 74 For a helpful overview, see generally Susan H. Williams, Essay, Feminist Jurisprudence and 
Free Speech Theory, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1563 (1994). 
 75 See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Democracy, Freedom of Speech, and Feminist Theory: A  
Response to Post and Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 603, 606 (2011) (“The feminist alternatives generally 
involve relational models of truth, as opposed to the traditional, Cartesian model.”). 
 76 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 832 (1990) 
(“Positionality rejects both the objectivism of whole, fixed, impartial truth and the relativism of 
different-but-equal truths.  It posits instead that being ‘correct’ in law is a function of being situated 
in particular, partial perspectives upon which the individual is obligated to attempt to improve.”). 
 77 See Williams, supra note 74, at 1568. 
 78 See infra note 239 and accompanying text (describing social epistemology and institutional 
approaches to the First Amendment, which similarly focus on truth-seeking as a social rather than 
individual enterprise). 
 79 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“To justify 
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if 
free speech is practiced.  There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended 
is imminent.  There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.”). 
 80 See, e.g., Jeremy Adam Smith, How the Science of “Blue Lies” May Explain Trump’s Support, 
SCI. AM.: GUEST BLOG (Mar. 24, 2017), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/how-the- 
science-of-blue-lies-may-explain-trumps-support/ [https://perma.cc/Q9WS-88DP]. 
 81 See, e.g., Joel Lovell, Can the A.C.L.U. Become the N.R.A. for the Left?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(July 2, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2lOCs2m [https://perma.cc/UR6E-6SG6] (“Since Trump took office, 
the A.C.L.U. has taken 170 ‘Trump-related legal actions.’”). 
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voices, particularly on the left, have condemned freedom of speech for 
having enabled and perhaps even facilitated a crisis.82 
One answer is that the arc of public discourse is long, but that it 
eventually bends toward truth.  Indeed, Justice Holmes’s own conception 
of the move to truth was likely more evolutionary than revelatory — not 
that individuals would frequently change their minds in response to new 
ideas, but that, collectively, public discourse would shift in favor of truth.83 
This account of the marketplace has the benefit of being more de-
scriptively plausible, at the cost of being — almost in equal measure — 
less normatively attractive.  For one thing, it allows a great deal of harm 
to be inflicted (likely against already marginalized groups) while speech 
markets work themselves pure.  Some current critiques of free speech 
focus on the magnitude and unfairness of these costs.84 
Advocates of the marketplace model have little choice but to concede 
many of these points.  It is undeniable that participants in the market-
place of ideas — like those in the “real” marketplace — are subject to a 
host of biases, irrationalities, and cognitive failings that prevent them 
from sorting truth from falsehood efficiently and effectively.  To the  
degree that the argument in favor of free speech is based on that instru-
mental value, it is an imperfect tool at best. 
And yet the fallback position is still available: imperfect, perhaps, 
but superior.  Defenders of the marketplace, whether in goods and ser-
vices or ideas, can and do argue that whatever its failings, free trade is 
better than government action at delivering the ultimate goods desired, 
whether they be economic efficiency or truth.85  This argument, based 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 82 See, e.g., Sarah Jones, How Donald Trump Poisons Free Speech, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 23, 
2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/144471/donald-trump-poisons-free-speech [https://perma.cc/ 
FQ9S-8F2M] (“This is all compelling proof that [free speech] absolutists may have to re-examine 
their arguments.  Above all, Trump’s presidency supports the notion that no law, even when it is 
enshrined in the Constitution, can alone justify an absolute position on free speech.”).  Contempo-
rary critiques of free speech protections for Trump and other members of the nationalist far-right 
find antecedents in the works of 1930s theorists like Karl Loewenstein.  See, e.g., Robert A. Khan, 
Why Do Europeans Ban Hate Speech?  A Debate Between Karl Loewenstein and Robert Post, 41 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 545 (2013); cf. Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, 
I, 31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 423–24 (1937). 
 83 See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 26 (“[T]he 
theory of evolution might help to explain why a robust freedom of speech can be extremely valuable 
even when most individuals remain stubbornly impervious to demonstrably valid refutations of 
their beliefs. . . .  As the population changes with the infusion of new persons with different ideas, 
the pattern of beliefs within the community changes, even if no single individual ever embraces a 
new idea or discards an old one.”). 
 84 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 5 (2012); Mari J. Matsuda, 
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2326–
41 (1989); see also sources cited supra note 73 (feminist critiques). 
 85 See SCHAUER, supra note 17, at 34 (“The reason for preferring the marketplace of ideas to 
the selection of truth by government may be less the proven ability of the former than it is the often 
evidenced inability of the latter.”). 
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on comparative advantage, permits the truth-seeking First Amendment 
to weather a great many internal critiques while still retaining its  
privileged position in free speech law and theory.86  The external cri-
tiques present a different type of challenge. 
2.  External: Truth Is Not the Central Value of Free Speech. — The 
critiques described above, though powerful and sometimes designed to 
dethrone the marketplace model, are “internal” to the epistemic theory.  
They accept (or at least can accept) that truth is a fundamental goal, 
while denying that unregulated speech is the right way to achieve it.  A 
more fundamental line of critique suggests that the theory not only has 
malfunctioning means, but also the wrong end.87 
Some of these “external” critiques begin by interrogating the notion 
of truth itself and questioning whether it actually has real value unless 
yoked to some other concept like power, or (more narrowly) whether its 
value must give way to others like dignity.88  But most people readily 
accept that truth either has intrinsic value89 or is so closely related to 
other values (like the informed action to which Abrams alludes90) that a 
theory attempting to maximize it is on the right track. 
A related line of argument is that truth is neither objective91 nor 
attainable,92 and that the marketplace therefore has no value.  Even 
accepting the minor premise, however, the major premise does not  
necessarily follow.  As Professor Kent Greenawalt puts it, “the truth-
discovery argument can survive a substantial dose of skepticism about 
objective truth.”93  Indeed, as described in more detail below, Justice 
Holmes himself seemed to share that skepticism, and yet — like the 
pragmatists with whom he is often associated — he believed that one 
can and should pursue the truth while (and by) continually subjecting 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 86 See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018) 
(quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 87 Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance 
and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 317 n.70 (1978) (noting that the Constitution does 
not structurally support the idea that the goal of the First Amendment is the quest for truth). 
 88 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 699, 713–
24 (1991) (questioning the value of truth when it conflicts with other values). 
 89 See infra section II.A.1, pp. 465–70. 
 90 See infra section II.A.2, pp. 470–72.  Recall that, just after invoking the “competition of the 
market,” Justice Holmes declared that “truth is the only ground upon which [people’s] wishes safely 
can be carried out.”  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 91 Ingber, supra note 49, at 25 (“[T]he assumption of the existence of objective truth is crucial to 
classic marketplace theory, [but] almost no one believes in objective truth today.”); see also Baker, 
supra note 66, at 974–81 (“The assumptions on which the classic marketplace of ideas theory rests 
are almost universally rejected today. . . .  First, truth is not objective.”). 
 92 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 617 (1982) (“[I]f we can 
never attain the truth, why bother to continue the fruitless search?”). 
 93 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 132. 
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received wisdom to testing.94  The search for truth itself can be  
valuable;95 one can get closer to truth without entirely reaching it.96 
Rather than making a frontal assault on truth and the pursuit 
thereof, other scholars have argued that truth is simply not the central 
value of the First Amendment.  The entire realm of free speech theory 
is far too broad to canvass, let alone explore in any detail.  It is sensible 
and common, however, to divide the other leading theories into two  
classes: those that prioritize democracy, and those that focus on personal 
autonomy.97  In general, the political-democracy accounts often  
associated with Professor Alexander Meiklejohn prioritize the  
importance of free speech to a well-functioning democracy.98  Such speech 
often involves false or non-falsifiable statements of preference and  
opinion.  Autonomy-based theories focus more on the self-realization 
and liberty of the individual speaker, not on whether speech advances 
the collective search for propositional truths.99  This is of course a  
necessary over-simplification, but the point of the discussion here is not 
to give those theories their due, but only to show how they diverge from 
the truth-seeking account. 
But even if one accepts that there is a lexical priority to free speech 
theory,100 and that democracy or autonomy must come ahead of truth, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 94 See generally Blasi, supra note 83 (discussing Justice Holmes’s relationships with pragmatist 
philosophers). 
 95 See Marshall, supra note 3, at 4 (“[T]he attack misfires when it suggests that the First  
Amendment value inherent in the search for truth exists only in its purported goal — the actual 
finding of truth.  The value that is to be realized is not in the possible attainment of truth, but 
rather, in the existential value of the search itself.”). 
 96 See Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 132.  The negative implication of Chaplinsky v. New  
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), is useful here — after all, the Supreme Court there denied consti-
tutional coverage to “certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” that “are no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”  
Id. at 571–72 (emphasis added). 
 97 See supra note 41 and sources cited therein. 
 98 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF- 
GOVERNMENT 88–98 (1948) (arguing, contra Justice Holmes, that the purpose of the First  
Amendment is to protect self-government); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 22–23 (1993) (arguing that Madisonian ideas of democracy, rather 
than free market principles, should shape First Amendment theory); Weinstein, supra note 44, at 
491 (“[C]ontemporary American free speech doctrine is best explained as assuring the opportunity 
for individuals to participate in the speech by which we govern ourselves.”). 
 99 See, e.g., SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 43 (“The first amendment may value participation and 
freedom more than truth.”); C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Free-
dom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1976) (arguing that the First Amendment protects a speaker’s self-
realization); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 216 
(1972).  Scanlon later abandoned this view.  T.M. Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy 
or Democracy?, 97 VA. L. REV. 541, 546 (2011). 
 100 See Post, supra note 19, at 1272–73. 
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the epistemic value of free speech remains important.101  Autonomy  
theorists do not necessarily need to rely on truth, though they need not 
and generally do not discount its value.  After all, in order to effectively 
exercise autonomous choice, achieve self-realization, or engage in  
self-expression, people typically count on reliable information.102   
Conversely, being subjected to lies or falsehoods has long been  
recognized — by Kant, most notably103 — as a threat to personhood. 
For democracy theories, the importance of reliable information — 
even “truth” — is more obvious.  A well-functioning democracy, after 
all, relies not just on people’s freedom to express their political opinions 
and instincts, but on the availability of expertise and knowledge.  The 
most prominent and powerful recent explanation of this relationship ap-
pears in the work of Professor Robert Post, who argues that while the 
animating value of the First Amendment is “democratic legitimation,” 
which is rooted in the equality of speakers and ideas without regard to 
truth or falsity,104 it also relies on the companion value of “democratic 
competence,” meaning the “cognitive empowerment of persons within 
public discourse, which in part depends on their access to disciplinary 
knowledge.”105 
The point is simply that democracy- and autonomy-based theories 
can be understood in ways that preserve the importance and value of 
truth.  But why should they have to accommodate themselves to truth, 
rather than the other way around?  Can an epistemic approach to free 
speech account for the values of democracy and autonomy? 
Perhaps the most obvious move is to include “political truths” among 
those that the marketplace is best suited to identify.  After all, the  
Framers described certain contestable political theories as being “truths” 
that were “self-evident.”106  If that is the case — indeed, if those truths 
are among the most important truths that the marketplace can identify 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 101 I believe that the converse is probably less true, at least for the simple marketplace model, 
which can and perhaps does treat truth as intrinsically valuable and therefore does not need to 
draw strength from democracy or autonomy approaches.  The knowledge-based approach draws 
much more heavily on — or at least is more compatible with — the other theories. 
 102 See David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of Self- 
Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 90–103 (2012) (focusing on ways in which lies might ad-
vance the autonomy interests of a lying speaker).  For a similar argument focused on listeners, see 
Alan K. Chen, Free Speech, Rational Deliberation, and Some Truths About Lies 4 (unpublished 
draft) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library), for an argument that some forms of fake news 
and other speech “might be understood to facilitate a type of listener self-realization that [Professor 
Alan Chen] call[s] ‘expressive experiential autonomy.’” 
 103 Varat, supra note 16, at 1113 (“Some commentators have borrowed from Immanuel Kant to 
urge that manipulative lies, at least, are incompatible with the respect for human autonomy under-
lying the First Amendment.”); see also SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 117–19. 
 104 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482, 484–85 (2011). 
 105 POST, supra note 15, at 34.  
 106 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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— then the truth-seeking and democracy-based approaches seem largely 
to collapse into one another.107 
But this co-opting solution is not entirely satisfying.  Few people 
think of the goals, let alone outputs, of politics as “truths” in the same 
way as the “ideas” that battle for acceptance in the marketplace.  
Though political debates are hopefully grounded in fact, and free speech 
may be able to help in that regard,108 no amount of market-style  
competition is likely to establish the “truth” of whether abortion or guns 
should be further regulated, or whether the United States should  
withdraw troops from Afghanistan, or whether the Senate should have 
confirmed Judge Merrick Garland.  Those resonate as normative issues 
that, while crucially important, do not have truth value in the standard 
sense.109 
To some degree, this is simply a semantic debate, and there is no 
point in trying to resolve it here.  What matters for the current discus-
sion is not conceptual precision (or accuracy, depending on whether one 
thinks there is a truth of the matter to be established), but the consider-
able cost that it would impose on the marketplace theory to expand the 
definition of truth in this way.  For most people, the attraction of the 
marketplace model is precisely its ability to develop and identify verifi-
able truths.  If one expands the goals and functioning of the market to 
encompass political beliefs and the like, then it starts to look a lot like 
the market exists simply to label as “truth” whatever commands the ma-
jority’s support.  That is a way to define truth, not to identify or, as 
Justice Holmes said, “test” it.110 
In sum, then, the marketplace model is in trouble.  In part, it faces 
rebellion from within, as scholars and others have justifiably pointed 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 107 The collapse need not be complete: it is possible that the real goal of a democratic theory 
might be participation or legitimation or some value other than the advancement of any particular 
“truths.”  Whether this entails conflation of the two theories is debatable.  See Schauer, supra note 
88, at 704–05 (arguing that it does). 
 108 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 132 (“[D]iscourse certainly can test the coherence of value claims, 
and can elucidate and clarify the values of a culture and of individuals.”). 
 109 I include the qualifying clause because I do not want to fully sideline the view that normative 
statements — unlike, for example, commands — can have truth value.  As a matter of doctrinal 
hydraulics, however, forces tend to push in the other direction, “systematically transmut[ing] claims 
of expert knowledge into assertions of opinion,” at least in public discourse.  POST, supra note 15, at 44. 
  For example, the Supreme Court has confirmed that, in order to be actionable, “statement[s] 
on matters of public concern must be provable as false.”  Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 
1, 19 (1990).  Accordingly, full constitutional protection must be extended to subjective assertions 
that do not articulate an objectively verifiable event.  See id. at 20–22.  Doubt is resolved in favor 
of treating something like an opinion rather than a fact.  See Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co., 22 F.3d 
310, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that, where “it is highly debatable whether [a] statement is suffi-
ciently verifiable to be actionable in defamation,” or “[w]here the question of truth or falsity is a 
close one, a court should err on the side of nonactionability” (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 110 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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out its inability to deliver the value — truth — that it is supposedly 
designed to maximize.  Additionally, it is under siege from outside, as 
competitor theories rooted in autonomy and democracy start to claim 
more and more of the territory. 
Perhaps most seriously, however, it faces neglect.111  This is doom in 
scholarly circles, where the worst castle is one that nobody wants to 
storm.  But it also represents a missed opportunity and challenge for the 
larger debate about free speech.  Rarely has the relationship between 
speech and truth been subject to a more searching public examination 
than right now.  And even those who defend free speech seem to do so 
on nonepistemic grounds. 
What connects many of the critiques and responses is a sense that 
the marketplace model is simply not worth an enthusiastic defense.  It 
might be grudgingly invoked, but only alongside an enumeration of its 
faults.  The concept of “truth” seems flat, unless leavened with the in-
clusion of normative beliefs or an understanding that truth is relative 
and socially determined — two moves that essentially answer the cri-
tiques by adopting them, thereby apparently giving up what made the 
marketplace model attractive in the first place.  Is it possible instead to 
provide a thicker and more successful epistemological account of the 
First Amendment? 
This Article claims that it is.  Epistemic defenses of speech can be 
salvaged from the rubble of the traditional marketplace of ideas.  This 
does not mean giving up entirely on the ability or desirability of speech 
as a mechanism of improving human understanding.  It does, however, 
mean recognizing that, in certain contexts and subject to certain con-
straints, the goal of free speech is not the maximization of truths in the 
abstract, but rather the development of knowledge.  Recreating First 
Amendment theory and doctrine around justified true belief, rather than 
truth alone, provides a more satisfying account of free speech and the 
practices that sustain it.  To understand why and how, it may help to 
take a brief detour. 
C.  The Road to Larissa 
In one of the most famous of the Socratic dialogues, Plato’s Meno, 
Socrates discusses with Meno the nature of virtue and its relationship  
to knowledge.  Socrates gets Meno to agree that a person can lead  
the way to the city of Larissa, “or anywhere else you like,” whether he 
knows the way or instead simply happens to have a right opinion about 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 111 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 130 (“During most of the twentieth century, consequentialist 
arguments [including truth-seeking] have dominated the discussion of freedom of speech, although 
the last two decades have seen a resurgence of nonconsequentialist arguments cast in terms of basic 
human rights and dignity.”). 
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it.112  It would therefore seem that, so long as a man “has the right 
opinion about that of which the other has knowledge, he will not be a 
worse guide than the one who knows, as he has a true opinion, though 
not knowledge.”113  Meno then asks, reasonably enough, “why 
knowledge is prized far more highly than right opinion, and why they 
are different.”114  Meno thus articulates both the crucial normative ques-
tion — why is knowledge more valuable than true belief? — and the 
definitional one — how is knowledge different from true belief? 
The remainder of this Article will attempt to unpack both of those 
questions in the context of the constitutional commitment to freedom of 
speech.  That context is important, for the goal here is not to advance 
or even describe the past two-and-a-half millennia of epistemology.  If 
the inquiry is to be useful to the legal question of free speech, it must be 
mediated through the First Amendment — the doctrines, practices, and 
theories that together constitute the American system of free speech.  
Part II attempts that task in some detail. 
At the outset, however, it is important to establish why and how the 
attempt is worthwhile.  The world hardly lacks for First Amendment 
theories, after all, and there is a very real risk that bringing more epis-
temology into the First Amendment will further muddle two already 
complicated fields.  The goal of this short section is simply to provide a 
prima facie case that the concept of knowledge is sufficiently valuable 
and distinct to merit the trip to Larissa. 
The place to begin is with the first part of Meno’s question: What 
makes knowledge “prized far more highly than right opinion”?115   
Socrates’s primary answer is that knowledge is “tied down” in a way 
that mere right opinion (that is, true belief) is not.116  He invokes the 
sculptures of Daedalus, which were said to be mobile: To “acquire an 
untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a runaway 
slave, for it does not remain, but it is worth much if tied down.”117   
He concluded by analogy: 
[T]rue opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is 
good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s 
mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) 
an account of the reason why.118 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 112 PLATO, MENO 97a (G.M.A. Grube trans.), in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 870, 895 (John 
M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchinson eds., 1997). 
 113 Id. at 97b, at 895. 
 114 Id. at 97d, at 895. 
 115 Id.  Throughout this article, I follow Meno’s lead in asking the normative question before the 
definitional one, though one could imagine asking them in either order — after all, the value of 
“knowledge” surely depends on what one means by the term. 
 116 Id. at 97d, at 895. 
 117 Id. at 97d–98a, at 895. 
 118 Id.  
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Socrates’s account thus provides one potential value proposition for 
knowledge: the former is a surer and stabler guide to action than truth 
alone.  That argument is fully consistent with — indeed echoes — First 
Amendment law and theory, at least to the extent that it connects belief 
and action.  Recall that the second and third of Justice Holmes’s  
propositions in Abrams (following the “competition of the market”) were 
that “truth is the only ground upon which . . . wishes safely can be car-
ried out” and that this is “the theory of our Constitution.”119 
The following Part considers this possibility in detail, along with  
others that might ground the value of knowledge in its instrumental 
relationship to the truth, its relevance to personal character, or its value 
in checking state power.  My goal here is simply to show that reorienting 
the epistemic account of the First Amendment so as to focus on 
knowledge rather than truth is worthwhile.  In doing so, I depart a bit 
from the existing literature.  As noted above, the standard defense to 
most attacks on the marketplace conception is to fall back on the  
comparative argument.  But that is both too much and too little of a 
concession.  What is needed is a fundamental reconsideration of the  
epistemic ends of free speech, not just a contingent defense of its ad-
vantage as a means. 
This is less an admission of defeat than an evolution in response to 
justified criticism.  After all, the marketplace theory itself is not immune 
to the “competition” that it celebrates.  Democracy- and autonomy-based 
theorists have regularly fine-tuned their theories’ central goals, and the 
epistemic First Amendment must similarly develop and grow if it is to 
keep pace. 
In that respect, it is worth noting that one common theme in the 
evolution of free speech theories has been not only to focus on the  
ultimate goods of democracy and autonomy, but also to emphasize the 
foundations of those values.  For democracy theorists, this often means 
protecting not only political speech or democratic outcomes, but also the 
mechanisms by which those outcomes are reached and justified — what 
Post calls “democratic legitimation.”120  Some strains of autonomy  
theory make similar moves by focusing on internal processes of think-
ing.121  What these accounts have in common is that they embed speech 
in some other central value (democracy or autonomy) as both a means 
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 119 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 120 See POST, supra note 15, at 18.  Post defines this term as the notion that “First Amendment 
coverage should extend to all efforts deemed normatively necessary for influencing public opinion.”  
Id.  Even Meiklejohn casts his theory as defending the community’s “thinking process” from being 
“mutilat[ed]” by the government.  ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1960) (emphasis omitted). 
 121 See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 298 (2011). 
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and an end.  It matters how we reach our democratic decisions, and it 
matters how we achieve or express our autonomy. 
The truth-seeking First Amendment generally lacks an analogous 
account — an argument for why truth reached through free speech is 
not only more likely but also more valuable than truth reached in some 
other fashion.  This gap leaves the marketplace model especially vulner-
able to the empirical challenges described above.  Some scholars have 
responded by emphasizing the value of the search for truth122 or what 
the competition of ideas means for character and culture.123 
Those defenses, in turn, share a common and valuable theme: an 
emphasis on ways of reaching (or at least seeking) the truth.  Like the 
democracy and autonomy variations discussed above, they focus on the 
journey, rather than the destination.  But that move seems harder for 
truth-focused theories than for the alternatives.  After all, democracy 
and autonomy are practices, whereas the common understanding of 
truth — even within First Amendment theories — is that it is an end.  
How, then, can we account for the distinctive importance of reaching 
truth in the right way? 
This brings us back to Meno’s second question about knowledge and 
true belief — “why they are different.”124  In Meno, Socrates says that 
in order to constitute knowledge, right opinions must be “tied down.”125  
Plato clarifies this concept in Theaetetus with the tripartite definition 
that remains the starting point of epistemological discussion — 
knowledge with “an account,” or justified true belief (JTB).126  The truth 
condition is relatively uncontroversial; one cannot know something that 
is false.  The belief condition (that one must believe something in order 
to know it) presents some complications, since one can imagine  
situations in which a person correctly and with justification answers a 
question without confidently believing herself to be correct.127 
The vast majority of scholarship and debate, however, has been 
about the justification condition: whether a justification is sufficient or 
even necessary for knowledge, and — assuming a positive answer to one 
of the first two questions — how to identify the kinds of justifications 
that count.  There are many ways to map that debate.  Below, I follow 
others by dividing the debate into “internal” accounts (those focusing on 
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 122 See Marshall, supra note 3, at 4. 
 123 See Blasi, supra note 83, at 26. 
 124 PLATO, supra note 112, at 97d, at 895. 
 125 Id. at 97e, at 895. 
 126 See PLATO, THEAETETUS 202c (M.J. Levett & Myles Burnyeat trans.), in PLATO: COMPLETE 
WORKS, supra note 112, at 157, 224  (“Now when a man gets a true judgment about something 
without an account, his soul is in a state of truth as regards that thing, but he does not know it; for 
someone who cannot give and take an account of a thing is ignorant about it.  But when he has 
also got an account of it, he is capable of all this and is made perfect in knowledge.”). 
 127 See, e.g., Colin Radford, Knowledge — By Examples, 27 ANALYSIS 1, 2–4 (1966). 
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the reasoning of the individual) and “external” accounts (those requiring 
justifications that might not be available to the individual).128 
My goal is to suggest that the debate over proper justifications has 
value for free speech theory, not to choose a side about which justifica-
tions (individual intellectual responsibility, disciplinarity, etc.) are to be 
preferred.  The range of justifications sufficient to transform a true be-
lief into knowledge is potentially quite broad.  One particularly demand-
ing view is the Cartesian one: a belief is justified if and only if one has 
an unshakable conviction about it.129  This view comes close to collaps-
ing truth and justification into one another.  An alternative approach, 
commonly known as reliabilism, counts as justified those true beliefs 
that emerge from cognitive processes that themselves tend to produce 
truth.130  Reliance on perceptions, good reasoning, and professional 
training might all satisfy that condition, whereas wishful thinking, mo-
tivated reasoning, and fabulism might not.  Some philosophers argue to 
the contrary that epistemic justification is not reliant on objective truth 
frequency, and must instead be regarded as a “normative notion”131 — 
a true belief is justified so long as it reflects the available evidence, how-
ever imperfect.  There are innumerable variations on the theme.132  
What connects them — and animates this Article — is the notion that 
justifications matter. 
Of course, as with any foundational philosophical definition, the JTB 
approach is not perfect.  Indeed, it is demonstrably incomplete, as  
Professor Edmund Gettier showed with his proof that some justified 
true beliefs (such as those resting on coincidence) are not knowledge.133  
But it remains the default definition of knowledge, and a pretty good 
one at that.134 
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 128 See, e.g., Husak & Callender, supra note 24, at 46; Steup, supra note 23, § 2.3. 
 129 See Lex Newman, Descartes’ Epistemology, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2019 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/ 
entries/descartes-epistemology [https://perma.cc/Y2CY-MS54]. 
 130 See, e.g., Alvin I. Goldman, What Is Justified Belief?, in JUSTIFICATION AND 
KNOWLEDGE 1, 20 (George S. Pappas ed., 1979) (presenting this view as an alternative to  
Descartes’s view); see also Cohen, supra note 25, at 280 (same). 
 131 Cohen, supra note 25, at 282, 285. 
 132 For a helpful overview, see Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, The Analysis of 
Knowledge, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 
2018 ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-analysis [https://perma.cc/ 
5N6J-JBL2]. 
 133 See Gettier, supra note 26; see also Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1138, 1160 n.71 (1999) (book review) (“I think everyone agrees that Gettier ‘proved’ that 
the analysis of ‘knowledge’ as ‘justified true belief’ does not work.” (citation omitted)). 
 134 See, e.g., John Turri, Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?, 184 SYNTHESE 247, 258 (2012) 
(“There’s a reason why so many smart people found JTB so attractive for so long.  Once we’re 
convinced that JTB is false, the next most plausible explanation for the attraction is that JTB is 
close to being true.  And if my analysis here is correct, then JTB hit very close to the mark indeed.”). 
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Focusing on justifications for truth means looking beyond the “com-
petition” between ideas and taking into account their foundations: a con-
sideration of the basis for our ideas, and not just their accuracy.  Bring-
ing this conception of knowledge into the First Amendment means 
adjusting many existing frameworks, including the marketplace model.  
But doing so might actually help preserve the epistemic and cognitive 
values underlying the marketplace approach. 
The road to Larissa, then, does not necessarily pass directly through 
the marketplace, but neither does it depart entirely from the standard 
materials of First Amendment law and theory.  The remainder of this 
Article will attempt to situate knowledge, and especially justification, as 
a distinctly constitutional value.  But as a starting point for that journey, 
it may be helpful to remember that Justice Holmes himself seemed to 
conceptualize truth as focusing not just on the destination — Larissa, as 
it were — but also on the voyage itself.  As he put it: “[a]ll I mean by 
truth is the road I can’t help travelling.”135 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND DEFINITION 
OF KNOWLEDGE 
The first Part of this Article had three main goals: to distill the fun-
damental arguments in favor of the marketplace of ideas approach to 
free speech, to acknowledge the strength and depth of the internal and 
external objections to it, and to make a prima facie case that knowledge 
has some appeal as an epistemic free speech value. 
These points set up two tasks for the second Part: first, to defend 
knowledge as a First Amendment value by establishing what is distinc-
tively and constitutionally important about it, and second, to define it 
by identifying what kinds of justification are constitutionally relevant.  
Epistemologists could take these questions in either order, but in construct-
ing a legal account of knowledge it makes sense to begin with the first. 
To some degree, the focus on justifications should come naturally to 
lawyers.  In law, justifications are often as essential as accuracy, whether 
in determining the culpability of a willfully ignorant defendant,136 as-
sessing the qualifications of an expert witness,137 or limiting the use of 
accurate and persuasive evidence that was unconstitutionally  
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 135 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Georgina Pollock 
(Oct. 27, 1901), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE 
HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874–1932, at 100 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941) 
(cited in Blasi, supra note 83, at 11 n.36); see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Assoc. Justice, 
U.S. Supreme Court, to Frederick Pollock (June 17, 1908), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra, 
at 139 (“[A]ll I mean by truth is what I can’t help thinking . . . .”) (cited in Blasi, supra note 83, at 11 n.36). 
 136 See Husak & Callender, supra note 24, at 41–53. 
 137 FED. R. EVID. 702 (permitting a person to testify as an expert witness if, inter alia, “the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods”).  
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obtained.138  In all of those situations, true belief is not in question, and 
yet the law may require proper justification as well.  Showing that jus-
tifications are relevant to law is only the beginning, however.  It remains 
to be shown that they matter to the First Amendment in particular. 
A.  Knowledge as a First Amendment Value 
In constructing a distinctively constitutional account of the value of 
knowledge, it makes sense to start with existing First Amendment the-
ories and materials.  The discussion in Part I has already begun this 
project by showing how a focus on justified true belief, rather than truth 
alone, can help address some weaknesses of the marketplace approach, 
while capitalizing on the strengths of competing theories rooted in de-
mocracy or personal autonomy.139  The task now is to make the connec-
tions more specific and concrete. 
1.  Knowledge as a Means to the Intrinsic Good of Truth. — 
Knowledge is already partly embedded in the truth goal that has been 
central to First Amendment jurisprudence.  And the current crisis in 
faith about truth as an end of First Amendment protection and theory 
looks less problematic when we shift focus from truth to justified true 
belief. 
Invocations of Abrams tend to focus on the marketplace mechanism 
for establishing and identifying truth, rather than on what Justice 
Holmes suggests about why truth matters.  This traditional approach 
invites the kinds of instrumental critiques discussed above, while failing 
to fully justify the epistemic goal.  A close reading of the passage, how-
ever, suggests not only a mechanism but also an underlying value: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.  That at any 
rate is the theory of our Constitution.140 
What is the “ultimate good” to which Justice Holmes refers?  One 
possibility — the one that most readers probably assume — is truth 
itself.  Perhaps, like equality or liberty or some other potential sovereign 
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 138 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (“The tendency of those who execute the 
criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced con-
fessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices de-
structive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of 
the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people 
of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.”). 
 139 See supra section I.C, pp. 459–64. 
 140 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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virtues,141 truth is a virtue that society is obligated to pursue for its own 
sake.142  At some basic level, this seems uncontroversial, as there is 
broad agreement that the advancement of truth is a value,143 even if not 
the central value, of the First Amendment.144 
One argument for knowledge as a First Amendment value, then, 
could be that it is instrumentally valuable for maximizing truth.  People 
committed to proper justifications for true belief might be better moti-
vated or better able to identify truth — in fact, for some epistemologists, 
this point is basically definitional.145  As Plato put it: “[S]omeone who 
loves learning must above all strive for every kind of truth from  
childhood on.”146  Plato might not have meant knowledge in the JTB 
sense (the quote comes from Republic rather than Meno or Theaetetus), 
but the point is widely accepted, if not easy to empirically verify, that 
falsity prospers where knowledge practices do not.147  It seems plausible, 
then, that pursuing the proper justifications (scholarly discipline, etc.) 
tends to lead to truth.  After all, sometimes the best or even only way to 
reach an end like being healthy is by cultivating particular means like 
healthy eating. 
On that note, it is worth emphasizing that, even on the most bare-
bones account of the marketplace model, what really matters are not 
true propositions but true beliefs.  The fact or breadth of belief might 
be irrelevant to whether a proposition is true,148 but it is immensely 
important to the normative evaluation of free speech as a social practice.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 141 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF EQUALITY (2000) (arguing that equal respect and treatment of citizens are the central virtues 
of democratic sovereignty). 
 142 See Marshall, supra note 3, at 27 (“It is not an overstatement to note that the concern with 
truth has dominated the Western intellectual tradition.”). 
 143 Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate Speech About Science, 106 GEO. L.J. 447, 464–71 
(2018) (“[T]he notion that truth has intrinsic epistemic value is widely accepted.”  Id. at 465.); 
Schauer, supra note 8, at 902 (“[I]t seems relatively uncontroversial to assert that, in general, truth 
is, ceteris paribus, better than falsity, that knowledge is, ceteris paribus, better than ignorance, and 
that a society with more true belief is, ceteris paribus, better than one with less belief in the truth 
or than one with more beliefs that are actually false.”); Schauer, supra note 88, at 704 (“The proposition 
that truth is necessarily and always valuable has been implicit in centuries of free speech theory.”). 
 144 See supra section I.B.2, pp. 455–459. 
 145 See infra notes 251–253 and accompanying text (discussing reliabilism and related approaches). 
 146 PLATO, REPUBLIC bk. IV, 485d (G.M.A. Grube & C.D.C. Reeve trans.), in PLATO:  
COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 112, at 971, 1109. 
 147 See Alvin I. Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas,  
2 LEGAL THEORY 1, 12 (1996) (arguing that “domains where maximum error and falsity are to be 
found . . . are precisely the ones relatively unserviced by formal education”). 
 148 Of course, even this statement is not true if one defines truth as majority belief, as a thin 
reading of Justice Holmes might suggest.  But it seems unlikely that this definition is the First 
Amendment’s conception of truth.  Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring) (“[A] State is, ordinarily, denied the power to prohibit dissemination of social, eco-
nomic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught 
with evil consequence.”). 
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Put another way: What is the value of a truth that no one believes?  The 
whole point of the connection between truth and free speech is to in-
crease the identification, understanding, and belief of those truths.149 
Recognizing the difference between truths and true beliefs is im-
portant, in part because it helps illustrate the point that one does not 
necessarily maximize true beliefs — or even truths — by flooding the 
market with true statements.  The availability and accessibility of truths 
are not enough for them to “get . . . accepted in the competition of the 
market,”150 if consumers in that market are not willing or able to accept 
them.  Indeed, Justice Holmes himself recognized as much: “One thinks 
that an error exposed is dead, but exposure amounts to nothing when 
people want to believe.”151 
Consider (it shouldn’t be hard) a world in which more truths are 
available than ever before, but are often washed away on waves of false-
hood.  With unimaginable amounts of information at our literal finger-
tips (and arguably within our “extended” minds152) there is nonetheless 
a pervasive sense of disquiet that we, as individuals and as a collective, 
are facing something like an epistemic crisis.  The sheer volume of in-
formation may overwhelm our ability to categorize, process, sort, and 
remember.  The proliferation of falsehoods makes it hard to trust any 
idea, which in turn saps people’s ability and willpower to engage in the 
kinds of debate that might put truth and falsehood to the test.  The 
ability to find information that confirms our initial judgments makes it 
harder to engage with challenging ideas, and all too easy to simply 
deepen our social or cognitive biases.153  The degradation of our attention 
spans makes it hard to engage in deep thinking or learning.154  And so on. 
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 149 Schauer, supra note 88, at 707 (“[T]he argument from truth is essentially an argument from 
knowledge.  The value asserted by the argument from truth is the value of having people believe 
things that are in fact true.  Truth, after all, is a property of a proposition and has little to do with 
human action or belief.”). 
 150 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 151 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Frederick Pollock 
(Aug. 30, 1914), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 135, at 219 (cited in Blasi, supra 
note 83, at 26 n.95). 
 152 The question of knowledge and extended minds as they relate to the First Amendment is itself 
an interesting and important one.  See, e.g., Betsy Sparrow et al., Google Effects on Memory:  
Cognitive Consequences of Having Information at Our Fingertips, 333 SCIENCE 776, 778 (2011) 
(observing that study participants are more likely to recall “where” on a computer a piece of  
information is stored than “what” it is). 
 153 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 69, at 1127–28 (discussing the tendency of people to 
utilize availability heuristics, which are facilitated by the easy availability of information). 
 154 See generally TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS (2016) (claiming that the modern 
attention span is decreasing steadily in the wake of overstimulation by mass media and information 
penetration).  But see Simon Maybin, Busting the Attention Span Myth, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-38896790 [https://perma.cc/6GSK-NMMV] (arguing that 
there is no conclusive proof that attention spans are declining). 
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But it is hard to cast these as problems within the traditional mar-
ketplace model, which tends to treat the proliferation of ideas as, if not 
an unqualified-albeit-instrumental good, at the very least a necessary 
evil.  There can indeed be situations in which the search for ideas is self-
defeating, but for the most part — as with economic markets — a 
broader and deeper market is likely to be more efficient and effective. 
On the JTB account, however, the sheer volume of information is 
not an unalloyed good.  What matters is the maximization of knowledge, 
which includes not only the volume of truths but also the quantity and 
quality of justifications — bases for believing those truths.  Strengthening 
shared commitments to justifications of true belief, moreover, can help 
overcome some (albeit not all155) of those cognitive biases and thereby 
facilitate the spread of truth itself. 
Mechanisms of knowledge might also improve the proportion of be-
liefs that are truthful.  There is, after all, a difference between simply 
maximizing the total amount of truths available and finding the most 
desirable equilibrium between true and false beliefs.  As Professors  
Alvin Goldman and James Cox put it: 
Each agent’s quantity of truth possession might be represented by his or her 
ratio of true beliefs to true-beliefs-plus-false-beliefs, or perhaps the ratio of 
true beliefs to true-beliefs-plus-false-beliefs-plus-no-opinions. . . . [T]he so-
cial ratio would be the total number of true beliefs (or believings) by mem-
bers of society divided by the total number of true beliefs, false beliefs, and 
no opinions.156 
This is an important distinction that is sometimes elided in the debate 
about the marketplace model, where the battle tends to be about 
whether the free exchange of ideas maximizes truth or falsehood, as if 
those are the only two options and the size of the overall set of beliefs is 
fixed.  In actuality, there is no necessary “cap” on the number of beliefs, 
and so the proportion between true and false beliefs is itself potentially 
as important as the total amount of true beliefs.  A person (or society) 
with ten true beliefs and one hundred false ones might be far worse off 
than one with nine true beliefs and no false ones. 
A great deal of current First Amendment scholarship focuses on the 
phenomenon of “fake news.”157  As with countless other free speech con-
troversies in the past (Nazis in Skokie and the like), one gets the sense 
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 155 Racism and other prejudicial beliefs are not purely cognitive problems, and so cannot be 
entirely fixed by more or better thinking.  See, e.g., Stuart Hall, Signification, Representation,  
Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates, 2 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 91, 108–
13 (1985) (arguing that race as an ideological category is overdetermined by its relation to other 
contested economic, political, and cultural practices and structures). 
 156 Goldman & Cox, supra note 147, at 5.  
 157 Although it undoubtedly owes much to President Trump, the surge actually began before his 
presidency.  See Horwitz, supra note 21, at 462 (noting, in 2012, that “[i]t is unsurprising that these 
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that scholars have little personal sympathy with the purveyors of fake 
news, but that those same scholars often conclude — sometimes but not 
always grudgingly158 — that fake news is nonetheless generally pro-
tected by the First Amendment.159  After all, the whole point of the 
epistemic model of free speech is that “the remedy to be applied is more 
speech, not enforced silence.  Only an emergency can justify repression.”160 
Sometimes fake news and related phenomena are described as evi-
dence of a “post-truth” era, or a society “in which truth seems to matter 
so little.”161  But the “post-truth” label can obscure something important 
about the people who believe fake news, lies, conspiracies, and other 
demonstrably false notions: they do not necessarily deny the value of 
truth.162  Quite to the contrary, many believe themselves to be in pos-
session of it, and that it has power, which is why President Trump goes 
to such great lengths to brand unwanted stories as “fake news.”163  One 
cannot combat the phenomenon, then, by simply insisting on the value 
of truth. 
What is missing is not a belief in the importance of truth, but declin-
ing faith in — and increasing disagreement about — the disciplines, 
institutions, and practices of knowledge.164  The underlying debate is 
about which sources and justifications for belief are valid: media, uni-
versities, churches, personal intuition, and so on.  That discussion is not 
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sorts of epistemological questions have interested First Amendment scholars” and that “[w]hat is 
more surprising, perhaps, is the sudden intensity of this interest”). 
 158 See sources cited supra note 102 (defending constitutional value of lying as a means of ad-
vancing speaker and listener autonomy). 
 159 See Clay Calvert & Austin Vining, Filtering Fake News Through a Lens of Supreme Court 
Observations and Adages, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 153, 156–58 (2018); Mark Verstraete & Derek 
E. Bambauer, Ecosystem of Distrust, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 129, 147–52 (2018) (sounding a 
“cautionary note on interventions,” id. at 147). 
 160 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 161 Schauer, supra note 8, at 919. 
 162 This view does not apply to everyone involved in the phenomenon of fake news.  Trolls, 
saboteurs, and others might very well be committed to purposeful attacks on what they know to be 
truths.  I will not address the constitutional status of such speech in any detail here, except to note 
that the First Amendment protects a great many lies, but also permits liability for certain falsehoods 
uttered with a culpable mental state.  The “speech” of algorithms, bots, and other nonhumans also 
raises threshold questions not addressed here.  For more comprehensive accounts of some of these 
issues, see Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1447 (2013) 
(arguing that the outputs of “most algorithmic-based editing” are speech for the purposes of the 
First Amendment); Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA . L. REV. 1495, 1517–24 (2013) (arguing 
for the usefulness of a “functionality doctrine” in considering the application of First Amendment 
protection in an increasingly algorithmic world, id. at 1518). 
 163 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2018, 5:38 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/965943827931549696 [https://perma.cc/94XR-VCDV] 
(“I have been much tougher on Russia than Obama, just look at the facts.  Total Fake News!”). 
 164 Cf. John O. McGinnis, A Politics of Knowledge, NAT’L AFF., Winter 2012, at 58, 59 (con-
trasting an “outdated approach” in which “analysis of potential improvements was to come from 
the top, foisted upon the public by experts and bureaucrats” with a “technological acceleration that 
provides new mechanisms for creating social knowledge”). 
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a debate about the value of truth, but about where it is to be found.  
What justifications can or should be privileged over others is a difficult 
but unavoidable question, addressed in part below.165 
Moreover, some truths may be more significant than others.166  The 
kinds of truths that one finds in the online marketplace of ideas, for 
example, might be precisely the kinds of accurate but trivial facts that 
contribute nothing to personal or social flourishing.  By contrast, true 
beliefs acquired through the development of expertise could be the kinds 
that most people intuitively regard as more valuable. 
Of course, this is a normative statement — inevitably so; the basic 
question is one of value, after all.  And to fully defend it would require 
a more precise account of the kinds of knowledge that an individual or 
society might prize (scientific, medical, and so on).  My point here is only 
the general one that knowledge, rather than truth, might better capture 
the epistemic values that most people really want from free speech: not 
only quantity, but also quality, of information. 
2.  Knowledge as a Guide to Action. — Similarly, knowledge fits into 
current First Amendment theory because it is a guide to action, a pre-
occupation of truth-based models starting with Abrams itself. 
Although most people probably agree that truth has some intrinsic 
value — that, all else equal, more truth is generally better than less — 
true beliefs are also important because they serve as a guide to informed 
action.167  People act on their beliefs, and when those beliefs are false 
they are likely to make worse decisions.  When people come to believe 
that Democratic leaders are operating a child sex ring out of the base-
ment of a D.C. pizza parlor,168 or that vaccines cause autism,169 and 
then act on those demonstrably incorrect beliefs, they often harm them-
selves and others in the process. 
The importance of the relationship between truth and action was 
emphasized in Abrams.  After stipulating the value of “competition” in 
identifying truth — the heart of the standard marketplace model —  
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 165 See infra section II.B, pp. 476-86. 
 166 Goldman & Cox, supra note 147, at 6 (“[I]t seems implausible to weight all propositions 
equally.  Believing a (true) law of physics or a (true) economic principle intuitively seems like a more 
significant cognitive accomplishment than believing a more humdrum truth.”). 
 167 See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1991) (“The First Amendment is based on the belief that people will 
make better decisions if they are more fully informed.”); cf. Paul A. David & Dominique Foray, 
Economic Fundamentals of the Knowledge Society, 1 POL’Y FUTURES EDUC. 20, 25 (2003)  
(defining knowledge as a quality that “empowers its possessors with the capacity for intellectual or 
physical action”). 
 168 See Amanda Robb, Anatomy of a Fake News Scandal, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 16, 2017, 3:07 
PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/pizzagate-anatomy-of-a-fake-news-scandal-w511904 
[https://perma.cc/Z7VK-824K]. 
 169 See Peter J. Hotez, How the Anti-Vaxxers Are Winning, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2k1LpSB [https://perma.cc/Q7SR-PLXN]. 
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Justice Holmes went on to say that “truth is the only ground upon 
which . . . wishes safely can be carried out” and that this is a part of “the 
theory of our Constitution.”170  On this vision, truth might not be valu-
able intrinsically, but as a basis for action — individual, perhaps, but 
also collective.  Justice Holmes would later reemphasize the tight con-
nection between truth, belief, and action in Gitlow v. New York,171 ar-
guing that an idea “offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on 
unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the 
movement at its birth.”172 
Recall that Meno’s question for Socrates was what makes knowledge 
more valuable than true belief alone.  Socrates’s answer was that 
knowledge is fastened or “tied down” in a way that makes it a more 
effective basis for action.173  A person who knows the way to Larissa is 
more likely to make it there, since mere true belief is more brittle and 
can be shaken — it has no foundation of justification on which to rest. 
If the purpose of true belief is to guide action, and knowledge does 
so better than true belief alone, then Socrates’s answer to Meno is also 
the answer to our constitutional question: knowledge is to be preferred 
to truth alone because it is a better guide to action.  A person or soci-
ety174 in possession of knowledge will stay the course — will reach  
Larissa — more dependably. 
This conclusion is consistent with the fact that truth-based accounts 
of the First Amendment often point to the instrumental value of truth 
as a guide to action.  A standard argument in favor of constitutional 
coverage for commercial speech, for example, is that it provides the kind 
of information that consumers need in order to make decisions.175  The 
competition of the marketplace — which in the case of commercial 
speech is both metaphorical and real — will help ensure that the  
information is true.  But when it comes to certain kinds of speech — 
those made in the context of a professional relationship, for example176 — 
accuracy is not left to the market.  As Professor Claudia Haupt notes: 
“T]he state may ensure that clients seeking professional advice are not 
harmed by ‘false’ ideas by way of imposing professional malpractice 
liability.”177  The link between information, understanding, and action 
in such contexts is such that law may legitimately intervene. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 170 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 171 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 172 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 173 PLATO, MENO at 97e, in PLATO: COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 112, at 895. 
 174 See Schauer, supra note 47, at 232 (exploring the distinction between individual and collective 
knowledge). 
 175 For an early exploration, see Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: 
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432–33 (1971). 
 176 See infra section II.C, pp. 486–496. 
 177 Haupt, supra note 40, at 1274. 
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Again, of course, there are normative questions and assumptions 
lurking.  Designing First Amendment doctrine so as to privilege 
knowledge will incentivize and enable certain kinds of action over oth-
ers — those that accord with whatever justifications the law recog-
nizes.178  To take just one example, Professor Paul Horwitz notes that, 
on one view: “[A]cademic freedom is prized primarily because its contri-
bution to truth-seeking will yield discoveries or insights that . . . benefit 
society at large.”179 
There are serious questions about which practices and institutions 
deserve this kind of deference.180  But at a general level, as with the 
argument that truth is generally better than falsehood, it seems relatively 
safe to say that truth-guided actions will generally be better than those 
guided by falsehood.  And if knowledge does a better job than true belief 
alone at maintaining the link between truth and action, then there is 
good reason for a system of free speech to prize it. 
3.  Truth, Knowledge, and Character. — Focusing on justified true 
belief, rather than truth proper, explicitly foregrounds the emphasis — 
already present in First Amendment theory — on the process of truth-
seeking.  Indeed, one reading of Justice Holmes is that he was not con-
cerned so much with the value of truth as a basis for action as he was 
with the competition of the market itself, and the kinds of values it de-
mands and develops, such as determination, drive, and a constant 
searching for the transcendent (leavened with the knowledge that it may 
be unattainable).181  On this view, the main benefits of the search for 
truth are the values that it inculcates, not the destination it reaches. 
As noted above, the standard account of the marketplace of ideas is 
that it provides the best means of developing and identifying truths.  But 
Justice Holmes himself was not confident that any single “truth” was 
waiting to be discovered.  As Blasi explains: 
Holmes certainly was a pluralist.  Throughout his adult life, in a variety of 
intellectual endeavors, he displayed an instinctive aversion to assertions of 
“absolute” truth.  He wrote to John Wu: “I don’t believe or know anything 
about absolute truth.”   He once described truth as “the majority vote of that 
nation that could lick all others.”182 
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 178 Cf. Schauer, supra note 88, at 709 (“[T]he argument from truth as an argument for freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press is parasitic on a theory of value or a theory of the good as to which 
knowledge is instrumental.”). 
 179 Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 484 (2005); see also Keyishian 
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (holding that “academic freedom . . . 
is . . . a special concern of the First Amendment” because “[t]he Nation's future depends” on chil-
dren being given “wide exposure to [a] robust exchange of ideas”). 
 180 See infra section II.B, pp. 476–86. 
 181 Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill’s and 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 66–67 (2010). 
 182 See Blasi, supra note 83, at 14 (footnotes omitted).  
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One way to read this passage is as defining truth simply as whatever 
emerges from the marketplace of ideas.  But that definition would make 
the relationship between truth and the marketplace more tautological 
than teleological.  If truth just is what the marketplace produces, then 
it is hard to see how it functions as an independent value sufficient to 
justify reliance on the marketplace. 
That result can be avoided if one understands Justice Holmes’s goal 
not as defining particular objective and consistent truths, but as requir-
ing continual testing and retesting of ideas and ideals — a marketplace, 
more than a market, as Blasi puts it.183  Blasi argues that Abrams “con-
tains the seeds of an understanding of the First Amendment that has 
more to do with checking, character, and culture than with the implau-
sible vision of a self-correcting, knowledge-maximizing, judgment- 
optimizing, consent-generating, and participation-enabling social mech-
anism.”184  Bill Marshall makes a similar move in his influential defense 
of the marketplace model, arguing that the “value that is to be realized 
is not in the possible attainment of truth, but rather, in the existential 
value of the search itself.”185  Both of these arguments emphasize the 
process of truth-seeking, not just the value of true beliefs themselves. 
The knowledge-based approach to the First Amendment similarly 
emphasizes not just the outcomes of free speech, but also the value of 
certain modes and habits of thinking.  In practice, the two will some-
times overlap.  Good justifications might be only those that reliably lead 
to truth.  In any event, to the degree that Abrams is about habits of mind 
and character, rather than truths, it fits more comfortably with a focus 
on knowledge than on truth alone. 
4.  Truth and the Role of the State. — A knowledge-based account 
of the First Amendment also helps answer a puzzle that the truth-centric 
approach stops short of addressing: If truth is the goal of First  
Amendment protection, why not allow speech regulation in specific ar-
eas where the government almost certainly has a comparative ad-
vantage in assuring or identifying verifiable truths? 
The answer to this question is not entirely satisfying from within the 
marketplace model.  Justice Holmes’s claim that the “best test” of  
truth is to get itself accepted in the marketplace of ideas is generally under-
stood as an argument that the marketplace of ideas will be more accurate 
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 183 Id. at 13 (“Perhaps the imagery that we should take from Holmes’s figure of speech is not 
that of a highly structured price-determining market such as a stock exchange, a mechanism de-
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 184 Id. at 2.  Blasi somewhat discounts the First Amendment’s “knowledge-maximizing” function, 
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 185 Marshall, supra note 3, at 4.  But see Schauer, supra note 88, at 704–08 (arguing that the 
search for truth has no intrinsic value). 
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than the state — that it will sort truths from falsehoods with fewer false 
positives and false negatives.186  This argument is an empirical one and is 
subject to all the concerns, weaknesses, and objections canvassed above.187 
A knowledge-based First Amendment might be able to fill the gap.  
On this approach, the question is not the simple empirical issue of how 
many truths are available, but what justifications are available for be-
lieving them.  Obviously, this entails identifying which justifications are 
appropriate and which are not — a project that Part II begins — but it 
is not hard to imagine that “because the government said so” would head 
the list of improper justifications.188  It is unacceptable because the state 
cannot oversee truth-seeking without eroding other underlying First 
Amendment values.  The concern is not whether the government can do 
a more accurate job in identifying truth (the standard marketplace  
argument), but whether its efforts to do so will trample on other im-
portant free speech principles. 
Consider the constitutional limitations on the government’s power to 
punish or prevent false speech.189  For the most part (commercial speech 
is a bit of an exception190), the First Amendment prevents this kind of 
regulation.191  But why?  Justice Holmes’s argument that the “best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the  
competition of the market” might be convincing in general, but surely 
not in cases where undoubtedly false statements are in play.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court itself has often said that “there is no constitutional value 
in false statements of fact,”192 and that such statements “are particularly 
valueless” precisely because “they interfere with the truth-seeking func-
tion of the marketplace of ideas.”193 
And yet, when faced with a case involving a statute punishing a 
limited set of such undeniably false statements, the Court struck down 
the law on First Amendment grounds.  In United States v. Alvarez,194 
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 186 See supra pp. 448–49. 
 187 See supra section I.B, pp. 451–59. 
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the petitioner had been convicted of violating the Stolen Valor Act,195 
which criminalized false claims of having received the Congressional 
Medal of Honor.196  There was no doubt that the petitioner had lied and 
no real defense of his lie’s value.197  A majority of the Court even 
acknowledged that the falsity of speech had counted against its consti-
tutional protection in some cases.198  Ultimately, the Court’s decision 
seemed to rest on its view that only a stronger historical tradition could 
justify the law.199  Whatever one thinks of the Court’s recent turn to 
historical categoricalism in First Amendment cases,200 it must be said 
that it does not flow naturally or neatly from a commitment to the  
marketplace of ideas. 
A knowledge-based approach could have provided a broader and 
more satisfying epistemic account.  Focusing on the inappropriateness 
of the law as a tool (again, not because it is blunt, but because it is 
forbidden) helps make sense of the fact that the Supreme Court has con-
sistently extended constitutional protection to false statements201 despite 
insisting that they have no value.202  One way to reconcile those seem-
ingly conflicting principles is to understand the former as an instantia-
tion of the rule that the government simply cannot prohibit falsehoods, 
even if it can identify them accurately and even if they have no value.  
True beliefs have less value if they are a result of government regulation.  
This is not inconsistent with Alvarez, to be clear — it is an alternative 
way of understanding the epistemic values at work. 
In fact, it might provide a better account of some aspects of the de-
cision, including the plurality’s repeated invocation of the concept of 
“integrity.”  The Court insisted that “[t]he Government’s interest in pro-
tecting the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question.”203  But 
what does “integrity” mean in this context?  The Court invoked the same 
concept in the course of noting that prohibitions on perjury similarly 
punish a particular kind of false speech, and have been upheld on a 
similar integrity-based rationale: “To uphold the integrity of our trial 
system, . . . the constitutionality of perjury statutes is unquestioned.”204  
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 195 Pub. L. No. 109-437, 120 Stat. 3266 (2006). 
 196 Id. at 713 (plurality opinion). 
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This is notable precisely because the protection of integrity is different 
from the pursuit of truth and is actionable even if it leads a jury to 
believe, accurately, that a particular defendant is guilty.  The harm has 
to do with processes of belief — with justifications, in other words. 
All of the examples described in the preceding four sections help show 
ways in which an account of free speech that focuses on justified true belief 
already exists in the doctrine — and in some cases better explains its com-
plexities — than an account focused more simplistically on “truth.” 
B.  Mapping a Knowledge-Based First Amendment: 
What Justifications Count? 
The discussion up until this point has attempted to show that there is a 
difference between truth and knowledge, and that there are good reasons 
to take the latter seriously as an important and distinct First Amendment 
value.  But what is, or should be, the First Amendment’s theory of 
knowledge?  What kinds of justifications are constitutionally relevant? 
The answers to these questions must come from within law.205  A 
constitutional theory of free speech that represented the cutting edge of 
epistemological thinking but failed to account for our actual First 
Amendment practice would be no constitutional theory at all.  The goal 
of this section is to show how various aspects of free speech theory and 
doctrine can — and in some ways already do — account for knowledge 
as a constitutional value.  My purpose here is only to show that  
justifications are important and that they might plausibly be identifia-
ble,206 not to resolve which justifications count.  After all, epistemolo-
gists, whose entire field is devoted to these questions, and who — unlike 
legal scholars — are relatively unencumbered by precedent, have yet to 
settle on which justifications transform a belief into knowledge.207  Some 
epistemologists define it to mean true belief alone,208 or true belief that 
is “safe”209 or “sensitive”210 in an epistemological sense.  One might  
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 205 Cf. Husak & Callender, supra note 24, at 48 (“The conception of justification typically employed 
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believing a proposition for which he possessed good evidence.  Exactly what form good evidence 
would take was again controversial, but for present purposes an intuitive understanding of  
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likewise agree that knowledge is a central First Amendment value, and 
yet disagree about what constitutes knowledge (as philosophers them-
selves do).  The same is true of other schools of First Amendment 
thought; many scholars agree that democracy is at the heart of the First 
Amendment, for example, but have different visions of what that means 
for the amendment’s coverage.211  Any type of justification-based ap-
proach falls within the ambit of a knowledge-based framework. 
1.  Justifications Internal to the Thinker. — One possible answer is 
that while the First Amendment values justifications, it cares only that 
individual thinkers do their best with the information available to them.  
Reckless, irresponsible, or malicious beliefs — even if true — would not 
be prioritized in the same way.  That does not mean that they would be 
totally unprotected, any more than falsehoods and opinion must be de-
nied constitutional coverage in a truth-based account.  The point is only 
that the constitutional goal would be to encourage true beliefs that have 
been reached in the proper way.  The justifications that count are those 
internal to the thinker. 
This approach maps substantially onto what is sometimes called the 
“internal” approach in epistemology.212  The basic point of that approach 
is that, in Professor Laurence BonJour’s explanation: 
[O]ne’s cognitive endeavors are epistemically justified only if and to the ex-
tent that they are aimed at this goal [that is, truth], which means very 
roughly that one accepts all and only those beliefs which one has good  
reason to think are true.  To accept a belief in the absence of such a  
reason . . .  is to neglect the pursuit of truth; such acceptance is, one might 
say, epistemically irresponsible.  My contention here is that the idea of  
avoiding such irresponsibility, of being epistemically responsible in one’s 
believings, is the core of the notion of epistemic justification.213 
On this account, the justification is something that is cognitively 
available to the individual thinker.  One might even go so far as to say 
that intellectual responsibility is its own reward.  Professors Douglas 
Husak and Craig Callender point to John Locke, who wrote in An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding that a person with justification “may 
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 211 Compare Bork, supra note 43, at 29 (arguing that the First Amendment covers only “criticisms 
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 212 See generally LAURENCE BONJOUR, THE STRUCTURE OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 
(1985); RODERICK M. CHISHOLM, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 76–77 (2d ed. 1989). 
 213 BONJOUR, supra note 212, at 8 (cited in Husak & Callender, supra note 24, at 50 n.78). 
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have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that, 
though he should miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it.”214 
The fact that Locke — a major influence on the Framers215 — seems 
congenial with this approach suggests that traces of it might be found 
within our free speech tradition.  One can see the same theme in Milton’s 
Areopagitica: “A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believe 
things only because his Pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines, 
without knowing other reason, though his belief be true, yet the very 
truth he holds becomes his heresy.”216 
And indeed some of the foundational critiques and defenses of the 
marketplace model seem rooted in the same basic notion.  Meiklejohn’s 
critique of Justice Holmes’s marketplace conception emphasizes this  
exact point: 
[The marketplace metaphor has been a] fruitful source of intellectual irre-
sponsibility and of the errors which irresponsibility brings.  We Americans, 
when thinking in that vein, have taken the “competition of the market”  
principle to mean that as separate thinkers, we have no obligation to test our 
thinking, to make sure that it is worthy of a citizen who is one of “the rulers 
of the nation.”  That testing is to be done, we believe, not by us, but by “the 
competition of the market.”  Each one of us, therefore, feels free to think as 
he pleases, to believe whatever will serve his own private interests. . . .  And 
to that disastrous end the beautiful words of Mr. Holmes have greatly  
contributed.217 
The passage bears rereading as it echoes so much contemporary angst 
about information and truth.  The “epistemic[] irresponsib[ility]” and 
“intellectual irresponsibility” that BonJour and Meiklejohn decry boil 
down to the same thing: a lack of internal justification for belief, such 
as doubting President Barack Obama’s natural born citizenship as a 
way of expressing disapproval of him, or believing a particularly  
outlandish claim about President Donald Trump for the same reason.  
Such motivated reasoning represents a paradigmatic case of epistemic 
irresponsibility.218 
Of course, serious challenges accompany the use of an internal- 
justification approach to knowledge as a constitutional lodestar.  One 
initial concern is that motivated reasoning is so completely pervasive 
that any theory that denies its value will be unduly narrow in  
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 214 Husak & Callender, supra note 24, at 50 n.77 (quoting 2 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY  
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 413 (Alexander C. Fraser ed., Dover Publ’ns. 1959) (1690)). 
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 218 I am grateful to Professor Govind Persad for illustrating this point.  
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scope.219  But, again, one can locate intellectual responsibility as the 
central value of the First Amendment while accepting that it is not uni-
versal, and might even be rare.  That does not mean limiting coverage 
to intellectually responsible speech any more than a truth-based account 
must deny coverage to falsehood. 
The real challenge is not one of scope, but of method: Can the law 
define the constitutional value of speech based on the mental states of 
individual speakers?  It can, and does.  After all, the constitutionaliza-
tion of defamation law has consisted in large part of an effort to identify 
the mental states — negligence, actual malice, and so on — that make 
a false statement actionable in various contexts.220  These are precisely 
the kinds of questions one would ask within an internal-justification 
model.  Whatever the practical and conceptual challenges, then, it is 
possible to imagine legal rules that would take into account a speaker’s 
justifications for her beliefs. 
In other ways — especially when accounting for the constitutional 
value of false but intellectually responsible (that is, justified) statements — 
the knowledge-based model might actually be more satisfying than the 
marketplace model in accounting for the current rules of defamation 
law.  Truth (the lodestar of the marketplace model) undoubtedly matters 
in the constitutional status of defamation rules.  It is (today, anyway221) 
regarded as a complete defense to a defamation claim.222  But the ques-
tion of truth is not all there is, because not all false statements are  
actionable.  Depending on the context, the statement must be made with 
actual malice,223 negligence, or some other actionable mental state.224  
These are constitutional limitations.225  The question, then, is why the 
First Amendment — and, for present purposes, the marketplace model 
in particular — should care about the basis (or, perhaps, “justification”) 
for a false statement. 
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 219 See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term — Foreword: Neutral Principles, Moti-
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(“There is broad societal consensus in support of the liberal principles that animate constitutional 
rights.  Citizens’ perceptions of what outcomes these principles should yield in particular cases, 
however, are subject to motivated cognition . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 220 See infra p. 479. 
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 224 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974). 
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Of course, the JTB account — with its focus on justifications — is 
not the only answer to that question.  The addition of mental state re-
quirements limits the scope of liability overall, thereby preserving more 
room for discourse, which might be seen as an unambiguous good from 
the perspective of free speech.226  In particular, the post-Sullivan consti-
tutionalization has often been defended as a structural protection of the 
press itself.227  One might also say that the First Amendment must pro-
tect false statements of fact because, essentially, the law cannot accu-
rately or effectively separate falsehoods from truth and there is too much 
risk that the latter would be swept in with the former, or valuable speech 
chilled.228  The argument is basically one of precaution, with the pro-
tection of falsehoods regarded as a necessary evil. 
There is much to be said for this argument.  Epistemic humility is a 
major First Amendment value229 and is consistent with a great deal of 
doctrine and theory.  But there is also something unsatisfying about it.  
There are some categories of cases in which separating falsehood from 
truth is possible.  Indeed, given that falsehood is an essential element of 
defamation, and truth is a complete defense, the doctrine already draws 
lines between truth and falsehood.  The reason for protecting falsehoods 
therefore cannot rest entirely on an inability to separate them from truths. 
What, then, is the positive case for protecting what we might call 
justified falsehoods — those unaccompanied by actual malice, negli-
gence, or another culpable mental state?  Professor Alan Chen argues 
that certain falsehoods can be valuable to autonomy and personal de-
velopment.230  Others, going all the way back to Mill, have argued from 
within the epistemic model that being exposed to falsehoods helps peo-
ple identify and believe in truth.231  Both of these arguments have much 
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to recommend them, and the latter in particular is fully consistent with 
the marketplace model. 
The knowledge-based approach can provide a different account: a 
false statement is deserving of constitutional coverage when it is based 
on a sufficient justification.232  The law, in other words, can protect in-
tellectual responsibility even when it leads to falsehood in a particular 
case.  This is effectively a restatement of the defamation rules.  And just 
as those rules are already tailored to different contexts, so too might we 
want and expect intellectual responsibility to be contextually tailored 
within the JTB model.  Perhaps absence of malice would be the proper 
threshold in some scenarios, while negligence might be the rule in others. 
Consider another of Justice Holmes’s free speech aphorisms: “The 
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in 
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”233  Scholars have 
tended to focus on why such speech might be excluded from First 
Amendment coverage — the most common explanation is that it leaves 
insufficient time and space for counter-speech.234  But the fact that there 
is no fire is what makes the shout actionable in the first place.  And that 
raises hard questions about falsehood and justification. 
Imagine that Justice Holmes’s theater-goer sees what appears to be 
smoke billowing into the theater.  Unbeknownst to her, the smoke is all 
part of the performance — a special effect intended to coincide with an 
upcoming scene in which the hero saves a child from a burning building.  
The theater-goer, honestly believing with justification that the theater is 
on fire, falsely shouts “FIRE!,” causing a stampede in which many peo-
ple are injured.  Those people sue.  Can she be found liable?235 
A judge faced with such a case would almost certainly focus on the 
theater-goer’s mental state.236  Though the shouter turned out to be in-
correct (that is, untruthful), she was not intellectually irresponsible — 
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not negligent, malicious, or even careless.  In other words, her internal 
justifications are sufficiently strong to provide a defense, notwithstanding 
the fact that her speech does not advance democracy or truth or any 
plausible First Amendment value besides her own autonomy. 
One might object that this approach would expand the realm of pro-
tected speech too far — after all, a falsehood is not knowledge, even if 
it is justified.  But a knowledge-based approach need not protect only 
knowledge, any more than a truth-based approach need protect only 
truth.  In both cases, the point is to orient law and theory toward a 
particular end.  And the knowledge-based approach, unlike one based 
solely on truth, makes justifications relevant, which in turn makes it 
easier to account for constitutional protection of the justified falsehood. 
2.  External Justifications for Knowledge. — Partly in response to 
the kinds of challenges discussed above, and also thanks to the funda-
mental problem posed by Gettier,237 some theories of knowledge have 
stipulated justifications that go beyond internal thought processes.  
These “external” theories involve something more.  An externalist 
“would say that what we want from justification is the kind of objective 
probability needed for knowledge, and only external conditions on jus-
tification imply this probability.”238  Often, but not always, these exter-
nal approaches overlap with social epistemology, which “focuses on pub-
lic and institutional practices that can foster the acquisition of 
knowledge or information.”239 
But in fact there seems to be considerable overlap between trends in 
epistemology — at least as they relate to external justifications — and 
First Amendment doctrine and scholarship.  Many free speech scholars 
have begun to focus on the practices and institutions that produce truth 
and knowledge, instead of (or in addition to) evaluating the truth value 
of particular statements.240  Applied to the issue of justification, this 
suggests that the question is whether a particular true belief has been 
acquired through the proper institutions and practices: professional 
training, higher education, open discussion, and so on. 
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Social epistemology is an attractive tool for the First Amendment’s 
epistemological challenges.  It allows one to remain generally agnostic 
about the truth value of particular statements, as Justice Holmes himself 
would have wanted,241 without giving up on the notion that some  
statements are true and some are false.  Moreover, social epistemology 
has much in common with First Amendment approaches that are  
themselves sociological, in the sense that they take account of — and 
privilege — certain institutions, practices, and disciplines.  Especially 
for the past fifteen years or so, free speech scholars have argued that 
free speech law can and should “recognize those informational, investi-
gative, and communicative domains whose more-or-less distinctive 
properties warrant special First Amendment treatment.”242 
Many of the scholars in this vein self-identify as institutionalists, and 
they advance a range of different arguments.  For some, institutionalism 
is simply a matter of bringing doctrine into step with lived reality, or of 
providing the self-governance without which certain social practices and 
organizations simply cannot survive, or of furthering the goals of a ro-
bust democracy and limiting the power of a sometimes-overweening 
state.243  For others, institutionalism is about finding a way to support 
the marketplace of ideas.244  Still others have pursued similar aims in 
the name of pluralism.245 
The search for valid justifications in a knowledge-based approach to 
the First Amendment might map onto these efforts to enumerate and 
justify special treatment of institutions, professions,246 social prac-
tices,247 and the like.  This is not an easy task from an epistemological 
or legal perspective, let alone from a perspective that combines the two.  
The underlying challenge is how to identify the incentives and social 
practices that have a particular relationship to knowledge. 
One possibility would be to begin with the marketplace model.  Just 
as truth is supposed to prevail over falsehood “in a free and open en-
counter,”248 so too might we expect desirable justifications to prevail 
over other justifications (or none at all).  The decline of traditional news 
media would on this view be prima facie evidence of its unreliability as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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a source of truth.  Like the marketplace of ideas, the marketplace of 
justifications approach would basically relieve judges and others from 
having to make difficult and inevitably normative determinations. 
But the marketplace logic seems even more problematic with regard 
to justifications than it does with regard to truth alone.  For one thing, 
the nature of the relevant “competition” is somewhat obscure.  Presum-
ably, it would mean that if two people have the same true belief and 
come into competition with one another, then the one with a better jus-
tification would “prevail” over the other.  Credentialed experts, for ex-
ample, might receive deference above and beyond the truth value of the 
statements that they are making at any given time. 
This is an empirical supposition, however, and it seems entirely plau-
sible that a marketplace of justifications will end up favoring those that 
confirm existing biases or are cheaply acquired.  From the perspective 
of an audience, truth acquired cheaply might be just as functionally use-
ful — and therefore prized — as truth that rests on a proper foundation.  
As a result, speakers who can provide truths at low cost have an ad-
vantage over those who have earned their true beliefs through expensive 
and time-consuming processes like higher education or professional 
training. 
In the end, it seems unlikely that a laissez-faire approach will result 
in identification of desirable (reliable, for example) external justifica-
tions.  What might be preferable would be to establish a list of desirable 
characteristics and an institutional actor capable of applying them  
accurately and legitimately.  Neither of these questions is easy, of course, 
but neither are they unanswerable.  As Greenawalt notes: “If truth is a 
meaningful concept and people are capable of asserting many proposi-
tions of fact and value with confidence, they must have some basis for 
recognizing what social practices promote the discovery of truth.”249 
To identify those social practices, Greenawalt suggests a kind of com-
parative and historical approach — “to look at various societies and 
historical periods to see when the discovery of truth has prospered.”250  
One might also look at practices and contexts within contemporary so-
cieties — comparing, for example, online message boards and university 
classrooms.  Truths appear in each of those places, but they appear more 
reliably in the latter. 
In fact, a version of this approach has long been defended in philo-
sophical circles.  The basic notion of reliabilism is essentially that certain 
practices reliably (even if imperfectly) lead to truth, and then can serve 
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 249 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 133; see also POST, supra note 15, at 32 (citing Allen Buchanan, 
Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 95, 103 (2004)) (emphasizing 
importance of “the social identification of experts, that is, epistemic authorities, individuals or 
groups to whom others defer as reliable sources of true beliefs”). 
 250 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 133. 
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as valid external justifications for knowledge.251  The question of pre-
dictive strength and reliability often comes up in discussions of science, 
where scientific knowledge is often evaluated based on probabilistic  
theories, not on a bright line around “truth.”252  Thomas Kuhn’s theory 
is consistent with this basic idea — that science does not salt away cer-
tain hard truths but is constantly subject to observation and retesting, 
and the occasional revolution.253  In the First Amendment context, this 
would mean that beliefs acquired through reliable practices have the 
proper justification to count as knowledge. 
This of course does not mean that judges and legal scholars should 
outsource First Amendment cases to the arbitration of epistemologists.  
But law often employs tools from other disciplines to help answer con-
crete questions like whether a particular arrangement of businesses is 
anticompetitive,254 or whether a burden on constitutionally protected 
activity is sufficiently tailored to achieve the government’s goal.255  
Epistemological debates do not always lend themselves to precision or 
certainty (though there are some arguments that are accepted as 
proofs256), but they are no less precise or certain than constitutional law 
as a whole, and they may be more important to legal reasoning than is 
sometimes supposed.257 
The basic questions of what makes knowledge valuable, and what 
makes it distinct from truth, are common to both enterprises, despite the 
additional twists and turns that constitutional analysis might mandate.  
There is no need for lawyers to pretend that the questions we face are 
unique and original when they are not.  Philosophical enquiries can be 
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 251 Steup, supra note 23, §§ 2.3–.5. 
 252 See Roesler, supra note 143, at 464–71 (“[P]robability theories share a common objective: they 
seek to test the relative strength of theories or hypotheses so that scientists can continually refine 
their theories. . . .  Legal doctrine should be based on this basic understanding of the inherent nature 
of scientific knowledge rather than on inapplicable notions of absolute truth versus falsity.”  Id. at 
471.).  Professor Shannon Roesler points to Karl Popper, who “argued that the strength of a given 
hypothesis depends on how well corroborated it is, which in turn depends on how well the hypoth-
esis has survived tests designed to disprove or falsify it and its boldness.”  Id. at 466. 
 253 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
 254 John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in 
Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 618–22 (2005) (noting that dependence on economics 
and economic experts has increased in recent antitrust litigation while also arguing that courts 
largely remain the gatekeepers for what sorts of economic authority and models are legitimate). 
 255 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201–04 (1976) (statistical surveys); see also Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (“In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, 
courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994))). 
 256 See, e.g., supra p. 463. 
 257 See generally Michael S. Pardo, The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof, 16 LEGAL THEORY 
37, 38 (2010) (arguing that there is a deep connection between knowledge and legal proofs). 
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a useful guide,258 and epistemology can help clarify and defend core 
concepts, even though — and perhaps because — lawyers and legal 
scholars tend to invoke the concept of knowledge more loosely than  
philosophers do.259 
C.  When and How Knowledge Matters: A Comment 
on Professional Speech and NIFLA v. Becerra 
Having ranged through First Amendment theory and epistemological 
debates, it is time to return to caselaw.  For even if the knowledge-based 
account is appealing as a matter of constitutional theory, epistemology, 
or information policy, to succeed as constitutional law it must be able to 
contribute to the adjudication of First Amendment disputes.  And it can. 
The constitutional treatment of professional speech is perhaps the 
most fruitful example.  Haupt defines such speech as that which “com-
municates a knowledge community’s insights from a professional to a 
client, within a professional-client relationship, for the purpose of giving 
professional advice.”260  Importantly, this is a contextual and somewhat 
narrow definition, not a prescription for giving heightened protection to 
any speech uttered by professionals or other “elites.”  And although with 
one notable exception (discussed below) the Supreme Court has yet to 
provide much guidance about the doctrinal status of professional 
speech,261 many cases have implicitly treated it as a distinct category.262  
Some have done so by striking down laws that interfere with the trans-
mission of professional knowledge.263 
But treating professional speech differently does not always mean 
giving it more protection.  Some courts have effectively exempted  
restrictions on professional speech from the strict scrutiny that usually 
applies to content-based restrictions.264  Licensing restrictions and  
malpractice liability are permissible in the context of professional 
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 258 See generally Blasi, supra note 83, at 18, 25–28 (noting Justice Holmes’s engagement with 
philosophers and thinkers outside the law, including Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and prag-
matists such as John Dewey, William James, and Charles Sanders Peirce).  
 259 Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2043 
(2009) (“Law and policy speak of knowledge in broader, looser, and more general terms . . . .”). 
 260 Claudia E. Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J.F. 185, 195 (2018); see 
also Haupt, supra note 40, at 1247. 
 261 Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 
183 (2018) (“[T]he Supreme Court has said little about the intersection of occupational licensing and 
the First Amendment.”). 
 262 Haupt, supra note 40, at 1240–41 (collecting cases). 
 263 See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017) (striking 
down recordkeeping, inquiry, and antiharassment provisions of the Florida Firearms Owners’  
Privacy Act, which limited physicians’ ability to discuss firearms with patients). 
 264 See, e.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014); Pickup v. Brown, 740 
F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014); Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 568–70 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
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speech265 notwithstanding the restrictions they place on the marketplace 
of ideas.  In effect, then, recognizing professional speech does not  
necessarily mean giving it “more”266 or “less” protection; it means  
recognizing the professions’ disciplinarity, which might sometimes be 
quite restrictive. 
For purposes of the knowledge-based approach, what matters is that 
the standards and practices of the relevant knowledge communities — 
whether they be scientific,267 academic,268 medical,269 journalistic,270 or 
otherwise — provide the standards against which the speech that claims 
their mantle must be judged.  In Post’s words, “democratic competence 
can be judicially protected only if courts incorporate and apply the  
disciplinary methods by which expert knowledge is defined.”271  And 
that means that the doctrine must confront precisely the questions with 
which this Article has attempted to grapple: which justifications for  
belief matter, and in which contexts? 
Unsurprisingly, the boundaries of professional speech remain con-
tested.272  It seems clear, though, that, in keeping with the JTB ap-
proach, they are defined in large part by epistemological method rather 
than by accuracy alone.273  It is the disciplinarity underlying it — the 
justification, in other words — that gives such speech its status, and not 
simply its accuracy in any specific instance.  If an expert is an expert 
only on the occasions when she is right, then there is nothing to the label.  
As Post puts it: “We rely on expert ‘knowledge’ precisely because it has 
been vetted and reviewed by those whose judgment we have reason to 
trust.  All living disciplines are institutional systems for the production 
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 265 See Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2014); Robert Post, Informed Con-
sent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
939, 950–51. 
 266 Sherman, supra note 261, at 183–84 (arguing that “occupational speech, including even expert 
advice, is entitled to far more protection than lower courts have given it, and is likely entitled to 
strict scrutiny”). 
 267 See, e.g., KUHN, supra note 253, at 3 (emphasizing the need to study actual episodes in the 
history of science — and the professional communities in which they take place — to understand 
scientific rationality).  See generally BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (2d ed. 1986) (examining the complex social, tech-
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 268 See Post, supra note 45, at 163 (“The social practices necessary for a marketplace of ideas to 
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inculcated in universities and professional academic disciplines.”). 
 269 See Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13 
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 296 (2010). 
 270 Blocher, supra note 227, at 440–42. 
 271 POST, supra note 15, at 54. 
 272 Haupt, supra note 260, at 188 (arguing for a narrow definition). 
 273 Haupt, supra note 40, at 1251 (“[M]embers of knowledge communities have shared notions of 
validity and a common way of knowing and reasoning (consider the old adage of ‘thinking like a 
lawyer’).” (footnote omitted)). 
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of such ‘knowledge.’”274  The identification of these disciplines will be 
contested, but that does not mean it is impossible.  As Greenawalt notes, 
“any idea that people are wholly incapable of evaluating what sorts of 
social practices promote discovery of truth is untenable.”275 
The crucial issue therefore becomes a boundary question about when 
professional speech is at issue.  Justifications, as a matter of law, are not 
always constitutionally relevant.  In many settings, other constitutional 
principles — the equality of speakers and viewpoints, for example — 
trump the First Amendment’s epistemological values.276  As suggested 
above, resolving the boundary question requires a threshold considera-
tion of the audience and context; professional speech doctrine does not 
apply to speech by a professional in public discourse.277 
One sees this distinction in Justice White’s influential concurrence in 
Lowe v. SEC,278 which until recently was perhaps the most significant 
pronouncement by a Justice on the question of professional speech.  
Writing for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
White concluded that “[o]ne who takes the affairs of a client personally 
in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the 
light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances is properly 
viewed as engaging in the practice of a profession”; any speech exercised 
in doing so is only “incidental” to that conduct.279  By contrast, a speaker 
who does not “purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any par-
ticular individual with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted” 
has a stronger First Amendment claim.280  Justice White’s distinction 
essentially maps the public-nonpublic distinction discussed above. 
Questions about professional speech lay at the heart of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra281 (NIFLA).  The case has been celebrated and criticized from 
a variety of different angles.282  My purpose here is not to provide a 
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 274 POST, supra note 15, at 8. 
 275 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 133.  
 276 See POST, supra note 15, at xiii. 
 277 See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result). 
 278 472 U.S. 181; id. at 211 (White, J., concurring in the result); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 
U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (concluding that “a rough distinction always exists” 
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bemoaning the influence of Justice White’s opinion on lower courts). 
 279 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring in the result). 
 280 Id. 
 281 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 282 See, e.g., Robert McNamara & Paul Sherman, NIFLA v. Becerra: A Seismic Decision Pro-
tecting Occupational Speech, 2017–2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 197, 197–98 (“[I]t is no exaggeration 
to say that NIFLA cements the Roberts Court as the most libertarian in our nation’s history on 
free-speech issues.”); The Supreme Court, 2017 Term — Leading Cases, 132 HARV. L. REV. 277, 351 
(2018) (“The Court fundamentally undermined its previous commercial speech doctrine, which al-
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abortion debate by carving out a convoluted exception to its previous medical-disclosure cases.”). 
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further broad assessment, but only to suggest that some aspects of the 
Court’s reasoning might have been improved by a tighter focus on 
knowledge, instead of appeals to the traditional marketplace model. 
At issue in NIFLA was a California law (the FACT Act283) that im-
posed disclosure requirements on what are sometimes called crisis preg-
nancy centers (CPCs), which might appear to be standard healthcare 
providers but in fact provide antiabortion counseling.284  As the Court 
summarized, the Act required that “[l]icensed clinics must notify women 
that California provides free or low-cost services, including abortions, 
and give them a phone number to call.  Unlicensed clinics must notify 
women that California has not licensed the clinics to provide medical 
services.”285  The Ninth Circuit upheld the restrictions.286 
In a 5-4 decision, with Justice Thomas writing for the majority, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the California law was a content-based 
restriction and struck it down.287  The Court declined to recognize 
(though explicitly did not foreclose288) a special doctrine for professional 
speech: “Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘pro-
fessionals.’”289  Denying protection to professional speech, the majority 
suggested, would give the state “unfettered power to reduce a group’s 
First Amendment rights by simply imposing a licensing requirement.”290 
This part of the decision rests on a false dichotomy.  Recognizing 
professional speech as a First Amendment category need not mean giv-
ing the state “unfettered power.”  It might, for example, mean giving the 
state power to recognize the professions’ own disciplinary standards — 
not their “truths,” but rather their methods of knowing.  That might be 
difficult, and contestable, but it would not leave professional speech “un-
protected.”  Nor would the doctrine extend to all speech “uttered by 
professionals.”  Even the most fervent supporters of professional speech 
doctrine do not suggest that it extends to all statements by professionals.  
Only in certain contexts is professional knowledge relevant — including, 
perhaps, the offices of licensed clinics.291 
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 283 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123470–123473 (West 2016). 
 284 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 285 Id.  See generally HEALTH & SAFETY § 123472. 
 286 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 829, 840 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d 
sub nom. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361. 
 287 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371, 2378. 
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treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment 
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 289 Id. at 2371–72. 
 290 Id. at 2375. 
 291 See Post, supra note 265, at 947–48 (evaluating the distinction between a dentist engaged in 
public discourse and one speaking outside of public discourse and subject to sanction).  How one 
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McNamara & Sherman, supra note 282, at 212–13 (summarizing approaches suggested by the 
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For present purposes, however, what is more relevant is the Court’s 
reliance on the marketplace metaphor: 
[W]hen the government polices the content of professional speech, it can fail 
to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail.”  Professionals might have a host of good-faith disagree-
ments, both with each other and with the government, on many topics in 
their respective fields.  Doctors and nurses might disagree about the ethics 
of assisted suicide or the benefits of medical marijuana; lawyers and mar-
riage counselors might disagree about the prudence of prenuptial agree-
ments or the wisdom of divorce; bankers and accountants might disagree 
about the amount of money that should be devoted to savings or the benefits 
of tax reform.  “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market,” and the people lose when 
the government is the one deciding which ideas should prevail.292 
It is hard to imagine a more confident statement of the traditional 
epistemic model — indeed, the notion that the truth “will ultimately 
prevail” is even more certain than Justice Holmes’s “best test of truth.”  
NIFLA therefore sets up an unusually crisp contrast between the mar-
ketplace model and the JTB alternative described here.  In significant 
ways, JTB proves more attractive. 
NIFLA’s marketplace model runs into problems from the start, 
many of which are the fundamental critiques that have plagued the 
model for so long.293  For example, the regulated context — licensed 
professionals speaking to potential patients about medical services — 
involves precisely the kind of power imbalance that makes many skep-
tical of the marketplace model.  And given the particular subject matter 
of abortion services, the notion that “truth will out” in the long run is 
especially unattractive, since a woman seeking an abortion has a limited 
(and in many places shrinking) time frame in which to obtain it.294  As 
always, the fallback defense for the marketplace model might be that it 
is still better than government regulation.  But that is not particularly 
convincing here, since the regulation itself — which applied only to con-
versations with patients — would not even reach the debates among 
professionals that the majority invoked.  That particular marketplace of 
ideas could continue to function as before. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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Even beyond the practical impact on speakers, the kind of law chal-
lenged in NIFLA involves a claim — compelled speech — whose harm 
is easier to conceptualize in terms of JTB than in terms of “truth” alone.  
The marketplace of ideas is usually thought to benefit from the addition 
of new voices and ideas.295  Of course, distortion and other concerns 
might be present, but, as the Court has previously noted, “disclosure 
requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser’s interests 
than do flat prohibitions on speech.”296  If the remedy for false speech is 
more speech, why shouldn’t the same be true of compelled speech?  A 
crisis pregnancy center might simply say: “We are required by law to tell 
you that the state of California provides low-cost abortion services.  But 
we believe that taking advantage of them is tantamount to committing 
murder, and we want to help you avoid that.”  This would, after all, 
come close to what the Court suggested that California could do: engage 
in its own “public-information campaign” to educate women about crisis 
pregnancy centers.297 
From the perspective of JTB, however, compelled speech presents 
an additional kind of epistemic harm: it interferes with the disciplinarity 
and social practices that contribute to true belief.  Under, for example, 
a reliabilist approach to justification,298 a particular practice’s ability to 
reliably produce true beliefs would be harmed if it were coerced into 
endorsing other beliefs.  If the medical profession reliably induces true 
beliefs in patients (that vaccines prevent certain diseases, for example), 
it may be particularly important that the messages coming from that 
profession be unedited by others.  Conversely, as Justice Breyer has put 
it, when “speech is subject to independent regulation by canons of the 
profession[,] . . . [which] obligat[e speech,] . . . the government’s own in-
terest in forbidding that speech is diminished.”299  The creation of 
knowledge, in other words, depends on a kind of nongovernmental reg-
ulation, which in turn shields that knowledge from unnecessary govern-
mental regulation. 
As to the intramural professional debates, as an epistemological mat-
ter the invocation of the marketplace in NIFLA was especially uncon-
vincing on the facts of the case.  The marketplace is uniquely ill-suited 
to resolve “good-faith disagreements”300 about the “wisdom of divorce” 
or the “ethics of assisted suicide.”301  Few people believe that there is 
epistemic “truth” on such matters.  They are fundamentally normative 
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debates over which even a capacious reading of the marketplace model 
would likely have only limited sway. 
Can and should such debates be informed by facts?  Of course.  And 
the JTB approach — and a doctrine of professional speech — can better 
account for how, as a matter of practice, law should and does treat some 
speakers differently in some contexts.  Lawyers might disagree with one 
another about the wisdom of prenuptial agreements, but only they can 
give legal advice about them.  Why does law recognize such a limit on 
speech?  Because lawyers and doctors are recognized as having special 
expertise, which in particular contexts — a professional relationship, per 
Justice White — demands different treatment.  That does not require 
that the profession reach unanimity on any of the contested issues listed 
in NIFLA, nor on others that have a more recognizable truth value.  The 
fact that lawyers and doctors might respond differently to different sce-
narios does not mean that their disagreements are anything other than 
professional.  They might disagree, and they might sometimes be wrong, 
but their professional training gives them the proper justifications for 
their beliefs.  When they fall short of those professional standards, they 
lose the benefit of that justification and may be subject to special forms 
of liability, like malpractice, that would be unconstitutional if applied in 
other contexts. 
The traditional marketplace model has a hard time accounting for 
these features of existing law.  Longstanding doctrine recognizes that the 
special status of the professions may allow legitimate restrictions that 
elsewhere would be unconstitutional.  For example, the Court has upheld 
“laws that require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial  
information in their ‘commercial speech.’”302  These laws are typically 
justified on epistemic grounds.303  Most prominently, in Zauderer v.  
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio,304 the 
Court upheld a fee disclosure requirement, explaining that “[b]ecause 
the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is 
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such 
speech provides,” the “constitutionally protected interest in not provid-
ing any particular factual information in . . . advertising is minimal.”305 
California argued that the FACT Act fell within this exception, since 
the disclosures were purely factual, and designed to counter what might 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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otherwise be confusion.306  But Justice Thomas’s majority opinion  
rejected this antideception purpose,307 and found that Zauderer was  
inapplicable — not because the specific information was anything but 
factual, but because, in part, state-sponsorship of abortion itself is  
controversial.308  As Justice Breyer noted in dissent, however, “[a]bortion 
is a controversial topic and a source of normative debate, but the  
availability of state resources is not a normative statement or a fact of 
debatable truth.”309 
The hard question after NIFLA will be where facts end and  
“controversy” begins.  This is a hard question to answer from within the 
marketplace framework, as it offers no obvious markers for when a 
“truth” has been “accepted,” to adopt Justice Holmes’s language in 
Abrams.310  There must be some limits, or else the exception would swal-
low the exception — the Court might as well have overruled Zauderer 
outright.  The question is who should get to draw those limits.  One 
possibility, of course, would be the people acting through their elected 
representatives.  But that would mean letting the government decide 
“which ideas should prevail”: precisely what the marketplace of ideas 
forbids.  NIFLA essentially tacks hard in the other direction, leaving it 
to judges to determine which matters are “controversial” and whether — 
as seems to be the case in NIFLA — that conclusion extends to all  
factual predicates of a normative debate. 
The knowledge-based approach, by contrast, would suggest that the 
limitations could be drawn by the relevant knowledge community itself.  
If scientists agree on the value of vaccines, then the matter is not “con-
troversial.”  If doctors do not agree on “the ethics of assisted suicide,” 
then it is controversial — either because there is “good-faith disagree-
ment” about truth, or (more likely) because it is a normative issue with 
no truth value.  It will of course be hard to decide which knowledge 
community should speak to which issue, and what level of agreement is 
necessary, and so on.  But current doctrine is essentially making these 
determinations already, in a far less transparent way.  NIFLA’s declaration 
that certain matters are “controversial” is an example of this phenomenon 
of opaque assessment. 
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To be clear, my goal here is not to offer a full-throated defense of 
professional speech doctrine.  There may be very good reasons to reject 
it, as evidenced by the Court’s reluctance to adopt a single doctrinal 
pronouncement,311 or the ability of existing First Amendment tools to 
justify it.312  NIFLA itself, for example, recognizes the possibility of re-
strictions on commercial advertising and professional conduct that 
nonetheless involves speech.313  My more limited argument is that the 
marketplace model is not a convincing reason to reject professional 
speech doctrine, and that the JTB approach gives more support for rec-
ognizing it. 
In short, if the goal of free speech is epistemic, then it makes sense 
to recognize the special role of the practices and institutions that justify 
our true beliefs.  Doing so of course can raise serious concerns, however, 
perhaps the most obvious of which is the apparent elitism of this ap-
proach.  Would it not mean giving special treatment to precisely the 
kinds of speakers (professionals, for example) who are already advan-
taged in the marketplace of ideas? 
Not necessarily.  First, my goal here is only to suggest that justifica-
tions matter, not to pick which ones matter.  I happen to think that 
distinct treatment of professional speech makes sense, but the JTB ap-
proach can certainly accommodate disagreement on that.  Others might 
argue that independent conclusions are more important than those 
reached through disciplinarity.  That is a separate debate from whether 
justifications matter. 
Moreover, to say that knowledge — or particular speakers — should 
receive special treatment is not to say that privileged treatment is ap-
propriate.  After all, a doctrine of professional speech would in many 
instances permit content-based restrictions that standard First Amendment 
doctrines would forbid.  The key is that such restrictions — like the JTB 
approach as a whole — are keyed not just to particular speakers (which 
would amplify the elitism concern) but to particular contexts.  Thus, 
while it may be impermissible for a state to fine citizens who claim the 
earth is flat, it is perfectly permissible for a state university to deny  
tenure to a geography professor who teaches as much, contrary to the 
standards of her discipline.  If that same professor were, on her own 
time and as a private citizen, to propound such theories in public  
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discourse, she would again be immune from sanction.  The full context, 
and not just the speaker’s identity, is what matters. 
More generally, this particular complication emphasizes the ways in 
which the JTB approach can and must operate hand in hand with 
broader social practices — those that identify the appropriate disci-
plines, institutions, or other justifications for true beliefs.  On that note, 
the “post-truth” challenge is not only about increased skepticism about 
“facts,” but about a lack of trust in institutions more generally.314  The 
theory relies on that trust, but cannot provide it.  Identifying a core of 
disciplinary knowledge deserving of special First Amendment treatment 
is a difficult task, made even harder when professional and licensing 
organizations understand themselves as being engaged with broader is-
sues of justice, fairness, and the like.315  That is not to say that 
knowledge-based fields must stay in narrow lanes, only that the confla-
tion of disciplinary knowledge and political positions makes it harder to 
provide an epistemic defense of the former.  Of course, for those who 
believe that knowledge is politics (or vice versa), that will not be satis-
fying.  The theory described here — or, for that matter, any epistemic 
account of the First Amendment — has little to offer them. 
This leads to the second caveat, which is that the JTB approach — 
like the theory it is meant to amend, though perhaps even more so — 
would have a limited reach.  Not all free speech controversies are ame-
nable to a theory rooted in epistemic values.  Restrictions on nonrepre-
sentational art or instrumental music, for example, are hard to evaluate 
from a “marketplace” perspective.  And while the JTB alternative might 
be an improvement (focusing as it does on practices, rather than truth 
value alone316), it is still an awkward fit for some contexts.  In public 
political discourse, for example, it might be more important to adopt a 
pathological frame and prevent any line-drawing among speakers and 
speech (even false speech, as in the Alvarez case discussed above), while 
other contexts would permit and even demand exactly that. 
There is nothing novel about this caveat.  Already, the Supreme 
Court treats truth and falsity differently depending on the context in 
which a statement is uttered — a statement that is actionable in the 
professional context might not be if uttered in public discourse.317  Of 
course, it is not easy to draw, let alone justify and maintain, the lines 
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between public and nonpublic discourse.318  Professor Paul Horwitz 
rightly notes that the Court “has not told us clearly . . . why citizens can 
generally be relied on to distinguish between true and false statements 
made in the political realm and not in other areas, such as commercial 
speech or securities fraud.”319  And yet the Court regularly does carve 
up the constitutional space in precisely that way — and, most im-
portantly for present purposes, it seems to do so especially often in cases 
where the justifications for facts are relevant. 
CONCLUSION 
In legal reasoning, it is not enough that a statement be true.  From 
the very first day of law school, students learn that accurately stating 
the result of a case is insufficient.  The reasoning matters just as much, 
if not more.  Likewise, an expert witness cannot be recognized, nor a 
professional licensed, solely on the basis of his her or true statements — 
what matters is whether he or she has been right for the right reasons. 
In First Amendment law and theory, the value of truth — and of the 
marketplace of ideas in achieving it — has been accepted as central to 
epistemic accounts of the value of free speech.  That reliance has made 
the epistemic account vulnerable to a wide range of powerful critiques.  
Reframing the First Amendment around justified true belief, rather than 
truth alone, might help resolve the amendment’s epistemological crisis 
and establish an epistemic value for free speech at a time when such an 
account is desperately needed. 
A knowledge-based approach will not rescue us from a post-truth 
era.320  But it can contribute to a richer and more productive discussion 
of what free speech is for. 
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